Adetoye v The Solicitors Regulation Authority

An application to extend time for appealing a disciplinary decision should be approached by the three-stage framework in Denton v TH White Ltd: assess the seriousness and significance of the default, identify its cause, and evaluate all the circumstances.

For solicitors, proven want of integrity normally attracts suspension. A tribunal may impose a lesser sanction only where exceptional mitigating circumstances make the case very unusual and venial. The appellate court should not interfere with the length of a disciplinary suspension unless the tribunal’s discretion has plainly gone completely off the rails.

The appellant, a solicitor and former compliance officer for legal practice, appealed against a two-year suspension imposed by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. The tribunal had found that he acted recklessly and without integrity in signing or permitting inaccurate court documents and in relation to client-account funds.

The notice of appeal was filed nine days late because the tribunal’s judgment had entered the appellant’s spam folder. The court had to decide whether to extend time and, on the merits, whether the sanction was excessive or the tribunal had failed to consider a restriction order.

1. Extension of time. An application for permission to appeal out of time is analogous to an application under CPR rule 3.9 and is governed by the three-stage approach in Denton v TH White Ltd, as explained in Altomart Ltd v Salford Estates (No 2) Ltd. The nine-day delay, occurring over the holiday period, was not particularly serious. The explanation was the appellant’s failure to check his spam folder, and the respondent suffered no injustice. The extension was granted.
2. Meaning and consequences of integrity. The court accepted the distinction between honesty and integrity described in Williams v SRA and approved in Wingate v SRA. Integrity concerns adherence to the ethical standards of the profession and requires more than honesty. The court regarded want of integrity as involving greater moral turpitude than mere dishonesty, although dishonesty generally attracts the more severe sanction.
3. Starting point for sanction. Where want of integrity is proved against a solicitor, suspension is the proper starting point. A tribunal may work downwards from suspension where exceptional mitigating circumstances make the case very unusual and venial. The tribunal had implicitly considered a restriction order and was entitled to conclude that suspension was necessary to protect the public.
4. Appellate restraint. The length of suspension is quintessentially a matter for the specialist tribunal. The court may interfere only where the tribunal’s discretionary exercise has gone completely off the rails. The two-year suspension fell within the usual tariff and was not excessive. The appeal was dismissed. The separate appeal against costs had been withdrawn.

Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: findings of misconduct, a two-year suspension and an order for payment of 12.5% of the respondent’s costs. The appellant appealed against sanction and costs.

High Court (Administrative Court): extension of time granted; appeal against sanction dismissed. The costs appeal was withdrawn.