JN (A Child)

A judge may change a decision before the order is sealed, but the overriding objective remains the just determination of the case. A change of position without new evidence or circumstances does not necessarily justify reopening a decision, particularly where delay would seriously harm the child. The court may determine family proceedings without oral evidence where the written evidence is sufficient, the proposed evidence is unlikely to affect the outcome, cross-examination would add nothing material, and the child’s welfare and the justice of the case favour expedition. In adoption proceedings, the court must consider all realistic options and may approve adoption only where, having regard to the child’s welfare throughout life, nothing else will do. Dispensing with parental consent requires a proportionate conclusion that the child’s welfare requires it.

Birmingham City Council applied for a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 and a placement order under section 41 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 concerning a 16-month-old child. The parents had initially opposed the applications but, after receiving legal advice and being informed that the orders would be made, withdrew their opposition. The father then sought to reopen the hearing and give oral evidence, without identifying new evidence or a material change of circumstances.

The central issues were whether the decision should be reopened, whether oral evidence was required, and whether the statutory thresholds and welfare requirements for care and placement orders, including dispensation with parental consent, were satisfied.

1. Reopening the decision. Applying Re L and B (Children) [2013] UKSC 8, the judge held that a decision may be changed before the order is sealed, but the overriding objective is to deal with the case justly and no exceptionality test applies. The father had been represented, had understood the consequences of withdrawing opposition, and identified no new evidence or material change. Reopening the case would probably cause substantial delay.
2. Fairness and delay. The judge balanced the father’s Article 6 and Article 8 rights against the child’s welfare. The child was profoundly deaf, required cochlear implantation within a short period, and needed extensive continuing treatment and aftercare. Delay could cause lifelong harm. The judge therefore declined to reopen the decision.
3. Oral evidence. Applying the factors in Re B (Minors) Contact [1994] 2 FLR 1, and the case-management powers recognised in Re B (Case Management) and Re C (Family Proceedings Case Management) [2012] EWCA Civ 1489, the judge held that oral evidence was unnecessary. The written evidence was clear and overwhelming; the proposed evidence was unlikely to affect the outcome; cross-examination was not sought on the key medical evidence; and welfare and justice strongly favoured avoiding delay.
4. Care and placement orders. The threshold under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 was agreed, but that did not make the orders inevitable. The court considered the statutory welfare checklists, proportionality, the child’s lifelong welfare, and every realistic family placement. The proposed care by the paternal grandmother was unsupported by sufficient evidence of medical provision, finance, suitability, or a realistic timescale for entry to the United Kingdom.
5. Following the principles in Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33, Re BS (Children) [2013] EWCA 1146, Re A (a child) [2015] EWFC 11, and Re J (a child) [2015] EWCA Civ 222, the judge was satisfied that adoption was necessary and that nothing else would do. The child’s medical, developmental, stability and permanence needs outweighed the benefits of remaining within her birth family. Consent was dispensed with under section 52(1)(b) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Care and placement orders were made.