Meyer v Baynes

Under the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules 2000, rule 13.3(2), exceptional circumstances require more than a real prospect of defending the claim. They require a compelling reason to permit a defendant to defend after default judgment. A knock-out point may qualify, including an unmaintainable claim or unavailable remedy. A defence supported by unsatisfactory evidence and relevant to only one of several independent claims will not suffice merely because it has a realistic prospect. Breach of the statutory duty imposed by section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third party Risks) Act Cap 288 may give rise to a private law cause of action. The Board also held, obiter, that an appeal as of right remains subject to the Court of Appeal’s control to ensure a genuinely disputable issue.

Baynes sued Meyer following a road accident, alleging liability under section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third party Risks) Act Cap 288 and vicarious liability for the driver’s negligence. After Meyer failed to serve a defence, default judgment was entered. Master Glasgow set it aside under rule 13.3(2), relying on his conclusions that the statutory claim was not actionable and that the vicarious-liability claim was inadequately pleaded. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision and refused leave to appeal as of right under section 122(1)(a) of the The Antigua and Barbuda Constitution Order 1981. The Board considered whether Meyer’s alleged prior sale of the vehicle constituted exceptional circumstances and whether the Court of Appeal retained control over an appeal as of right.

Appeal dismissed. The Board advised that the appeal be dismissed, subject to costs submissions.

1. Rule 13.3(2) requires something more than a real prospect of success. The Board endorsed the Court of Appeal’s view that exceptional circumstances require a compelling reason why the defendant should be permitted to defend proceedings after default judgment. A knock-out point may constitute such a reason, as may a claim that is not maintainable or a remedy that is unavailable.
2. Master Glasgow’s decision was based on errors concerning both limbs of the claim. The Court of Appeal correctly held that breach of the statutory duty imposed by section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third party Risks) Act Cap 288 gave rise to a private law cause of action for the protected class of third-party road users. It also correctly held that the amended pleading adequately alleged that Hernandez was Meyer’s servant and was acting in the course of his service.
3. The evidence that Meyer had sold the vehicle before the accident was unsatisfactory, although it disclosed a defence to the statutory claim with a realistic prospect of success. It was not a knock-out point or a compelling reason under rule 13.3(2). It was, at best, only peripherally relevant to the vicarious-liability claim, and either claim independently supported the default judgment.
4. The second issue could not affect the outcome, but the Board addressed it at the parties’ request. An appeal as of right under section 122(1)(a) of the The Antigua and Barbuda Constitution Order 1981 does not deprive the Court of Appeal of all control. Applying the reasoning in A v R (Guernsey) [2018] UKPC 4, the Court of Appeal could police the application and require a genuinely disputable issue within the prescribed category. Its refusal of leave did not exceed its jurisdiction.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, subject to any written submissions within 14 days.

1. Privy Council. Permission to appeal was granted, and the Board dismissed the appeal.
2. Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Antigua and Barbuda). Allowed Baynes’s appeal, reversed the order setting aside the default judgment, and refused Meyer leave to appeal to the Board as of right.
3. Master Glasgow. Set aside the default judgment under rule 13.3(2) of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules 2000.