Parveen, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Redbridge

When judicial review proceedings become academic after the claimant obtains substantially the relief sought, costs do not depend solely on the relief obtained. The court must consider whether the proceedings caused or materially accelerated that outcome. If causation or the likely merits cannot be determined through a summary and proportionate assessment, it may make no order for costs.

Withdrawal creates no default rule that the claimant must pay the public authority’s costs. Costs remain fact-sensitive and discretionary. An appellate court may intervene only for an error of law or an unjust or perverse exercise of discretion.

The claimant sought judicial review of the council’s provision of temporary hostel accommodation for herself and her six daughters and of its preparation of her Personal Housing Plan. Shortly before the substantive hearing, the council offered self-contained accommodation after receiving further medical evidence. The claimant accepted the offer and withdrew the proceedings, while both parties reserved their positions on the merits.

The Administrative Court made no order for costs because it could not determine, without a full trial, whether the proceedings had caused the offer. The claimant appealed, relying on M v Croydon London Borough Council [2012] EWCA Civ 595. The central issues were whether the judge had misapplied the guidance governing costs in compromised public law proceedings and whether his discretionary order could be disturbed on appeal.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Administrative Court was entitled to make no order for costs. Its decision disclosed no error of law and was neither unjust nor perverse.

2. When a withdrawn judicial review leaves costs for determination, there is no starting point or default rule that the claimant must pay the defendant’s costs. The court must apply the fact-sensitive and discretionary guidance in M v Croydon London Borough Council [2012] EWCA Civ 595 and related authorities. The substance of the resolution governs the order.

3. Obtaining substantially the relief sought does not by itself establish success for costs purposes. The proceedings must have caused or contributed to the relief, including by securing it materially earlier than would otherwise have occurred. The judge implicitly accepted that the claimant had obtained much of what she sought but was entitled to regard causation as decisive.

4. Determining costs after settlement or withdrawal is a summary and proportionate exercise. The court has limited scope to resolve conflicting evidence and should not conduct satellite litigation into the operational reasons why a public authority allocated scarce housing resources to one applicant rather than another. Where causation is not reasonably plain, the court may fall back on making no order for costs.

5. The material before the judge consisted largely of competing assertions. It did not clearly establish whether the litigation caused or accelerated the offer, or whether the offer followed independently from new medical evidence and the council’s continuing assessment. The judge was not required to undertake an extensive examination of the underlying documents.

6. Nor was it tolerably clear, through a proportionate assessment, that the claimant would have succeeded on the merits. Suitability was highly fact-sensitive, and the legal issue would have been whether the council’s view that the hostel was suitable as short-term accommodation was irrational. The complaints about the council’s conduct carried little or no material weight.

7. An appellate court may interfere with a costs order only where the judge made an error of law or exercised the discretion in a way producing an unjust or perverse result. Neither basis was established.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed the claimant’s appeal and upheld the order that each party bear its own costs.

2. High Court, Administrative Court: Following withdrawal of the judicial review claim, Steven Kovats QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, made no order for costs because causation could not be determined without a full trial.