Uddin v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Whether adult relationships constitute family life under Article 8 depends on their substance. The irreducible minimum is effective, real or committed support; exceptional dependency is unnecessary.

The same test applies to foster and birth families. The formal or commercial character of foster care carries no significant determinative weight. Reaching adulthood creates no presumption for or against continuing family life. Continued cohabitation is a highly material, though not decisive, indication that the necessary support continues.

The appellant, a Bangladeshi national, entered local-authority foster care after being abandoned in London aged 13. He remained with his foster family after reaching adulthood and relied on that relationship when applying for further leave to remain.

The Secretary of State refused leave. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed his human-rights appeal, finding no family life beyond normal emotional ties. The Upper Tribunal upheld that decision, treating the foster placement as a commercial arrangement supported by the state.

The appellant appealed against the Upper Tribunal's order. The central issues were whether the tribunals had adequately considered the evidence and whether Article 8 family life arising from foster care should be assessed differently from family life within a birth family.

1. Appeal allowed. The First-tier Tribunal's factual conclusion was unsustainable because it neither referred to nor analysed the prima facie evidence of the relationship, gave no reasons for finding that family life did not exist, and treated the commercial character of foster care as determinative of dependency. The Upper Tribunal failed to correct those errors.

2. The test for adult family life under Article 8 is whether there is effective, real or committed support. Dependency is not a term of art and exceptional dependency need not be proved. The inquiry is fact-sensitive and concerns the substance, rather than the form, of the relationship.

3. The test is the same for foster and birth families. No authority supported treating foster care as a special category in which family life must be proved differently. The fact that foster carers are appointed, supervised or paid by a local authority is only one potentially relevant factual consideration. It carries no significant determinative weight.

4. Reaching the age of 18 does not itself terminate family life and gives rise to no positive or negative presumption. Continued cohabitation is highly material, although not conclusive. It will commonly indicate the continuing bonds of effective, real or committed support that underpin family life.

5. The tribunals had failed to evaluate substantial, consistent and uncontradicted evidence from the appellant, his foster mother, his social worker and local-authority records. That evidence included continued cohabitation, close attachment, emotional and practical support, and a Pathway Plan contemplating residence with the foster family until at least age 21. A new tribunal was required to assess all relevant evidence afresh.

6. The orders of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal were set aside. The case was remitted for redetermination by a differently constituted First-tier Tribunal. King and Bean LJJ agreed with the Senior President of Tribunals.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was allowed. The orders of both tribunals were set aside and the case was remitted to a new constitution of the First-tier Tribunal.
2. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): On 2 October 2018, Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell upheld the First-tier Tribunal's decision, finding no error of law in its conclusion that family life did not exist.
3. First-tier Tribunal: On 16 July 2018, Judge Herlihy dismissed the appeal from the Secretary of State's refusal of leave to remain, including the claim under Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.