Williamson, R. v

When assessing whether sentences imposed on co-defendants create unfair disparity, the court must consider differences in culpability and personal mitigation. A lower sentence for another offender does not itself establish unfairness where those differences explain it.

Under section 144 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, credit for a guilty plea depends on the real procedural course of the case. A defendant who absconds and thereby delays the process may properly receive substantially reduced credit. The appropriate response remains fact-sensitive. If absconding is reflected by reduced credit, no additional penalty should be imposed for the associated failure-to-surrender offence.

The applicant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Southampton to conspiracy to rob, arising from a planned armed robbery of a jeweller’s shop. He was one of the offenders who entered the shop, smashed display cabinets and removed jewellery and watches worth about £620,000.

HHJ Parker QC treated the offence as Category 1A under the applicable sentencing guideline. Taking 18 years’ custody as the sentence after trial, the judge allowed the applicant 10 per cent credit for his late guilty plea and imposed 16 years and 10 months’ imprisonment. A concurrent three-month sentence was imposed for failing to surrender to custody, contrary to section 6 of the Bail Act 1976.

The applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence. He alleged unfair disparity with two co-defendants and insufficient credit for his plea. During the appeal, the court identified an arithmetic error in the application of the 10 per cent reduction.

1. Appeal allowed to a limited extent. The court granted an extension of time and leave to appeal. It quashed the sentence of 16 years and 10 months and substituted 16 years and two months, giving effect to the sentencing judge’s intended 10 per cent reduction from 18 years. The concurrent three-month sentence for the Bail Act 1976 offence remained.

2. There was no arguable unfair disparity. A disparity is not unfair where it is explained by a co-defendant’s lower culpability or special mitigation. Sharif’s learning disability reduced his culpability, while Gregg-Ball’s later involvement and personal mitigation justified a lower provisional sentence. The applicant’s 18-year provisional sentence was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle, and another offender’s favourable sentence did not supply him with a ground of appeal.

3. Section 144 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires the court to assess the stage at which a defendant indicated a guilty plea in the proceedings and the circumstances of that indication. The formal date of the applicant’s eventual plea at the plea and trial preparation hearing did not control the assessment. He had failed to attend court after receiving a requisition and had evaded justice until arrested on a bench warrant. The judge was therefore entitled to limit credit to 10 per cent.

4. R v Ward [2014] EWCA Crim 2667 supported the conclusion that failures to comply with the criminal process may justify a reduced plea discount. There is no fixed rule: in some cases substantial credit for the substantive offence and a consecutive sentence for failure to surrender will be appropriate. In others, reduced credit will be just and proportionate. Where the absconding has already reduced credit, there should be no additional penalty for the failure-to-surrender offence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was varied only to correct the arithmetical application of the plea discount.
• Crown Court at Southampton: On 28 November 2019, HHJ Parker QC sentenced the applicant to 16 years and 10 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to rob, with a concurrent three-month sentence for failing to surrender to custody.