Cummins, R v

Following a trial, a sentencing judge must sentence on the only factual interpretation consistent with the jury’s verdicts. Where the verdicts permit more than one interpretation, the judge must determine the factual basis to the criminal standard. If unable to be sure, the judge must adopt the interpretation most favourable to the defendant.

A sentencing judge must independently evaluate all information relevant to dangerousness. The judge is not bound by an expert opinion and need not adjourn for further expert evidence merely because the judge rejects that opinion. On appeal, a finding of dangerousness will stand unless it was plainly wrong.

The appellant pleaded guilty on the first day of trial to robbery and unlawful wounding. The jury acquitted him of trespass with intent to commit a sexual offence and sexual assault.

At Sheffield Crown Court, the judge imposed an extended sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment, comprising a 13-year custodial term and a five-year extension period. The appellant challenged the factual basis for sentence, the 10 per cent reduction for his guilty pleas, and the finding that he was dangerous.

The central issue was whether the judge’s factual findings and dangerousness assessment were lawful and compatible with the jury’s acquittals.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

2. The jury’s acquittals did not require the judge to accept the appellant’s account that he had mistakenly entered the complainant’s home. Applying R v King [2017] EWCA Crim 128, a judge must sentence on the sole possible interpretation of a verdict. If there is more than one possible interpretation, the judge must decide the factual basis to the criminal standard; if the judge cannot be sure, fairness requires adoption of the interpretation most favourable to the defendant.

   Here, the acquittals established only that the jury were not sure of a sexual intention or that any touching was sexual. They did not establish acceptance of the appellant’s wider account. The judge was entitled to find that he had deliberately targeted a vulnerable woman’s home, armed himself with a knife, and initiated the violence. Those findings were consistent with the verdicts.

3. A 10 per cent reduction for pleas entered on the first day of trial was proper. Although the appellant had admitted some conduct earlier, he had not indicated before trial that he would plead guilty to robbery and unlawful wounding.

4. The sentencing judge was entitled to find a significant risk of serious harm and to impose an extended sentence. She was required to reach her own conclusion on all the information before her. She was not bound by the forensic psychologist’s low-risk assessment and was not obliged to adjourn for a further report because she rejected its analysis.

5. The appellate test was whether the finding of dangerousness was plainly wrong, namely whether no reasonable judge could have reached it. The pre-planned entry into a vulnerable woman’s home while armed, the serious violence used, and the appellant’s continuing minimisation of his conduct justified the finding and the extended sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against sentence was dismissed. Leave had been granted by the single judge.

• Crown Court at Sheffield: The appellant received an extended sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment for robbery and unlawful wounding. That sentence was affirmed.