A, R. v

Evidence of a deceased person's alleged bad character is inadmissible under section 100(1)(b) unless it has substantial probative value on a matter of substantial importance. Unproved assertions in school records and an unexplained, hearsay nickname did not satisfy that test.

Known bad character may in principle inform a defendant's belief for self-defence. It will not assist where the asserted belief is founded on the immediate alleged threat rather than remote incidents or general reputation. A conviction will not be quashed on a speculative lurking doubt.

The appellant, aged 15, was convicted unanimously at Reading Crown Court of murdering his friend, also aged 15, by stabbing him in a park. His case was that the deceased had attacked him first with a knife and that he acted in self-defence.

The trial judge admitted evidence of the deceased's caution for possessing a knife. She refused further proposed evidence of the deceased's alleged violent conduct, school records and nickname under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 100(1)(b). She also restricted proposed cross-examination of a prosecution witness and of the appellant's aunt.

The appeal challenged those rulings and contended that the conviction was unsafe because of a lurking doubt, including concerns about a majority-verdict direction given during the developing Covid-19 situation. The central issue was whether the exclusions deprived the appellant of admissible and materially probative evidence relevant to self-defence or safety.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction was safe. The trial judge made no material error in excluding the proposed evidence and there was no basis to disturb the jury's assessment of the appellant's and the defence witness's accounts.

2. The proposed school records did not have substantial probative value for the purposes of section 100(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. They contained no recorded serious violence or weapon possession, included assertions not to be treated as proved, and recorded an improvement in the deceased's later behaviour. The alleged nickname was unexplained hearsay. Its admission would have invited speculation about its meaning and origin. The evidence concerning a separate incident was no longer pursued, and the appellant had in any event been permitted to give his own evidence about it.

3. The restrictions on the proposed questioning of S and the appellant's aunt were also correct. S's account of unspecified fights was hearsay and lacked detail as to their cause or initiation. The aunt was permitted to say that the appellant had described the deceased as having a violent temper. The excluded reference to a special behavioural school added nothing material and could not properly have been used consistently with section 100.

4. The court accepted that bad character known to a defendant may, in principle, bear on that defendant's state of mind. On the appellant's own account, however, the altercation was fast-moving and his asserted response was to an immediate knife attack. Remote knowledge of alleged school behaviour or an earlier incident could not materially explain that response.

5. There was no non-speculative basis for a lurking doubt. The judge acted within her discretion in giving a majority direction amid Covid-19 concerns, and the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict about an hour later. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appellant's appeal against conviction and held that the murder conviction was safe.
• Reading Crown Court: A jury unanimously convicted the appellant of murder on 20 March 2020. He was sentenced to detention at Her Majesty's Pleasure with a minimum term of nine years, less remand time, and to a concurrent sentence for possessing a bladed article.