Cuthbertson, R. v

Where a magistrates’ court sentences an offender for some offences but commits other offences to the Crown Court for sentence, each court is separately dealing with the offender for the offences before it. Subject only to the statutory exceptions, each court must therefore impose the prescribed surcharge.

The duty under Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 161A admits no exception based on fairness, a single incident, a single set of proceedings, or an assertion that all offences should have been committed to the Crown Court. The prospect of a further surcharge may nevertheless be relevant to a magistrates’ discretionary decision on committal for sentence.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the magistrates’ court to driving without a licence and failing to provide a breath specimen. He also indicated a guilty plea to assault occasioning actual bodily harm, but initially advanced a disputed basis of plea.

The magistrates sentenced him for the road traffic offences, including a £122 surcharge, and committed him to the Crown Court for sentence for the assault. The Crown Court imposed eight months’ imprisonment, a restraining order and a further £149 surcharge. The appeal challenged only that further surcharge, on the ground that it was unfair for two surcharges to arise from offences dealt with in the same overall proceedings.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Crown Court was required to impose the £149 surcharge when sentencing the appellant for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

2. Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 161A imposed a general and mandatory duty on a court dealing with an offender for one or more offences to order payment of a surcharge. The statutory exceptions were limited and it was common ground that none applied.

3. The magistrates had dealt with the appellant by sentencing him for the road traffic offences. They were therefore required to impose the appropriate surcharge. The Crown Court then dealt with him by sentencing him for the assault. It too had to impose the appropriate surcharge, notwithstanding the earlier order.

4. Abbott [2020] EWCA Crim 516 concerned activation of suspended sentences or action for breach alongside sentence for new offences. It did not govern two courts sentencing separately for different offences. No analogy could displace the clear statutory duty.

5. Fairness, the fact that the offences arose from one incident, and whether the magistrates could or should have committed all offences to the Crown Court were irrelevant to section 161A’s application. However, when exercising committal powers, magistrates may treat the prospect of a further surcharge as a relevant, fact-specific consideration.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the Crown Court’s surcharge order.
• Crown Court at Stoke on Trent: sentenced the appellant for assault occasioning actual bodily harm to eight months’ imprisonment, imposed a five-year restraining order, and ordered a £149 surcharge.
• Magistrates’ court: sentenced the appellant for the road traffic offences, including a £122 surcharge, and committed him to the Crown Court for sentence for the assault.