Reece, R v

Under section 74(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a conviction in the United Kingdom or another EU Member State proves that the defendant committed the offence unless the defence proves the contrary on the balance of probabilities. Where the defendant has not clearly raised such a challenge, a trial judge need not give a direction on it or repeat every detail of the defendant’s evidence when summing up. A concise and balanced summing-up may properly identify the similarities and differences between earlier offending and the charged conduct, and limit bad-character evidence to additional support. A conviction will remain safe where there was no material misdirection and, in any event, substantial independent evidence of guilt.

The appellant was convicted at Preston Crown Court of four conspiracies concerning the importation and supply of Class A drugs. The prosecution alleged that he was a trusted associate of Frank Eaton and relied, among other evidence, on the appellant’s 2011 Belgian conviction for possessing substantial quantities of cannabis and cocaine with Eaton.

The trial judge admitted the Belgian conviction as bad-character evidence and directed the jury that it could provide additional support only if it established the alleged propensity. On appeal, the appellant contended that the judge should have reminded the jury of his evidence that he had not known that drugs were in the vehicle involved in the Belgian offence, and should have directed them under section 74(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The central issue was whether the summing-up rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge’s summing-up did not contain an error capable of rendering the convictions unsafe.

2. Section 74(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 makes a conviction, including one from another EU Member State, proof that the defendant committed the offence unless the defence proves the contrary. The burden is on the defence and the standard is the balance of probabilities. The court applied the ordinary rule stated in R v CarrBriant [1943] KB 607.

3. The appellant had not challenged his guilt in the Belgian offence when opposing the bad-character application or at any earlier stage. His trial evidence raised a possible uncertainty, but the judge intervened to clarify it. The appellant then accepted the conviction, and the issue was not pursued. Consistently with R v C [2010] EWCA Crim 2971, a bare assertion did not require the court to treat the earlier conviction as disproved.

4. The judge had fairly directed the jury that the Belgian matter could be used only as additional support if it established propensity, and that it could not found a conviction wholly or mainly. He also identified factual differences between the earlier offence and the charges. The court accepted that R v Hanson [2005] EWCA Crim 824 did not require the judge to repeat every detail of the appellant’s account. Represented counsel neither sought a section 74(3) direction nor requested an expanded summing-up.

5. There was also substantial independent circumstantial evidence of guilt, including the appellant’s close association with Eaton, his role at the delivery premises, his work on equipment containing a drug concealment, and Eaton’s trust in him. Accordingly, even if an omission had occurred, it would not have affected the safety of the convictions.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) On 19 June 2018, following an Attorney General’s application concerning undue leniency, quashed the original sentence and substituted concurrent sentences of 19 years’ imprisonment.

• Crown Court at Preston On 8 March 2018, convicted the appellant of four Class A drug conspiracies. On 9 March 2018, imposed concurrent sentences of 16 years’ imprisonment.