Eaton, R v

Where a juror is discharged because an apparent connection creates a real possibility of bias, the court must separately assess whether that circumstance creates a real possibility that the remaining jury is biased. The objective test is that of the fair-minded and informed observer. Speculation that the discharged juror may have influenced other jurors, without evidence of actual bias, misconduct, or improper influence, does not require discharge of the whole jury.

A clear and conventional direction that the remaining jurors must disregard anything said by the discharged juror may preserve the fairness of the trial. The decision must turn on justice, not cost or convenience.

The applicant and three co-defendants were convicted at the Crown Court at Bristol of murder and two offences of wounding with intent after a violent attack in a flat. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment.

During the judge’s summing-up, information suggested that one juror might have an indirect connection with co-defendant Parker through persons involved in drug dealing. The juror was discharged by agreement. The judge refused the applicant’s submission that the whole jury should also be discharged and gave directions to the remaining 11 jurors.

Following refusal by the single judge, the applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal against conviction. The issue was whether the potential connection and the absence of further inquiry rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused. The conviction was safe.

2. The trial judge correctly applied the objective apparent-bias test in Porter v. Magill [2002] 2 AC 357. The known indirect connection created a real possibility of bias in favour of Parker and justified discharging that juror. It did not, however, establish a real possibility that the remaining jurors were biased.

3. The judge was entitled to reject the submission that the discharged juror had infected the rest of the jury. There was no evidence of actual bias or misconduct by her, and no sound basis to infer that she had improperly influenced the other jurors. Such an inference remained speculative. The question was one of justice, rather than cost or convenience, but a court should not too readily discharge a jury on speculative risks of injustice.

4. The judge had followed the relevant procedures in the Criminal Practice Direction VI, including isolating the juror, consulting counsel, establishing the available facts, and deciding the future conduct of the trial. Further inquiry into what the juror had discussed with fellow jurors was precluded by section 20 of the Juries Act 1974.

5. The direction to the remaining jurors was properly balanced and conventional. It made clear that the discharged juror was no longer part of the jury and that they must disregard anything she may have said. This differed materially from R v Blackwell [1995] 2 Cr App R 625, where nothing had been said about the departing juror. The remaining jury could fairly determine the case.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The applicant renewed an application for leave to appeal against conviction after refusal by the single judge. The renewed application was refused.
• Crown Court at Bristol: Following a jury trial before Warby J, the applicant was convicted of murder and two offences of wounding with intent, and sentenced to life imprisonment.