Nursing & Midwifery Council & Anor v Harrold

A general civil restraint order may be extended where this is necessary to protect other litigants and the court’s finite resources from further vexatious litigation. The extension test is whether it is appropriate to extend the order, read in the light of the requirements for imposing one initially. The court must consider recent conduct and the restrained party’s right of access to justice.

The inherent jurisdiction and Senior Courts Act 1981 s 37 do not, without an established jurisdictional basis, permit the court to impose a permission filter on complaints to legal regulators. Regulators’ own procedures and statutory remedies may address meritless complaints.

The Nursing and Midwifery Council and North Bristol NHS Trust jointly applied to extend a general civil restraint order against Alvida Harrold for a further two years. The order restricted claims and applications in the courts and tribunals without permission. Mrs Harrold applied for its discharge.

The order had previously been made and extended after findings that numerous proceedings were totally without merit. She sought to reopen concluded employment and regulatory matters and alleged dishonesty and fraud by the opposing legal teams. The applicants also sought to prohibit complaints to legal regulators without permission. The central issues were whether the order remained appropriate and whether the court had jurisdiction to impose the proposed complaints restriction.

1. The applications. The application to discharge the existing general civil restraint order was dismissed. The order was extended for two years, covering claims and applications in the County Court, High Court, Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal without permission from the applications judge in the Queen’s Bench Division.
2. Extension of the order. Under CPR 3C PD §4.10, the question on an extension is whether extension is appropriate. The court applied the principles identified in Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Gray [2016] EWHC 2998 (QB), including the need to protect litigants and finite court resources while having full regard to the restrained party’s right of access to justice. Recent evidence is particularly important, as explained in Sheikh v Page [2017] EWHC 1772 (QB).
3. Mrs Harrold’s proposed proceedings sought to relitigate matters already finally determined. The earlier findings of Laing J were binding in the subsequent proceedings, and the proposed challenges disclosed no arguable basis. Further attempts to reopen those matters would be totally without merit. A GCRO could also validly cover the Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal under the inherent jurisdiction, alongside the order made under CPR 3C PD.
4. Complaints to regulators. The request to extend the order to complaints against legal representatives was refused. The inherent jurisdiction is directed to regulating the court’s process and preventing abuse of that process. Its description as unlimited does not permit any order considered desirable. Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 likewise requires an established head of jurisdiction or a compelling incremental development.
5. Complaints to professional regulators do not interfere with the due course of justice in the same way as proceedings in another jurisdiction. The regulators’ procedures were capable of dealing with meritless complaints. Repeated meritless complaints might instead engage the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The judgment was sent to the Attorney General for consideration of an application under s 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 for an all-proceedings order.

The judgment describes earlier stages in the same litigation:

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): Hamblen J held that restraint covering Employment Tribunal proceedings could in principle be imposed under the inherent jurisdiction or s 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981: [2015] EWHC 2254 (QB).
• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): Laing J made the general civil restraint order after finding that many claims were totally without merit: [2016] EWHC 1078 (QB).
• Court of Appeal: permission to appeal Laing J’s decision was refused as totally without merit.
• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): the present court extended the order for two years, refused to restrain complaints to legal regulators, and directed that the judgment be sent to the Attorney General.