H (Deceased), Re

In an adult child’s claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, the court must first decide whether the deceased’s disposition made reasonable financial provision and then determine what provision should be made if it did not. The statutory factors apply to both stages.

Maintenance is concerned with meeting everyday living expenses. It may be provided by a lump sum, including a sum enabling the applicant to obtain housing, but it does not extend to every desirable expenditure. Need is necessary but not sufficient for an adult child’s claim. The award must reflect the applicant’s needs, the beneficiary’s needs, the size of the estate, the relationship and obligations involved, and any relevant conduct. A case-specific allowance may be made for a success fee under a conditional fee agreement where otherwise primary needs would be unmet.

The claimant, an adult daughter, sought reasonable financial provision from her late father’s estate under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The estate was principally represented by her brother, as personal representative, while her mother was the sole beneficiary and lived in residential care.

The claimant relied on severe mental illness, inability to work, housing difficulties, therapy costs, income shortfall and liabilities under a conditional fee agreement. She sought, among other matters, provision to purchase a home. The central issues were whether the will made reasonable financial provision for her and, if not, the nature and amount of the award required.

1. Two-stage statutory inquiry. The court applied the two-stage approach reaffirmed in Ilott v The Blue Cross and others [2018] AC 545: whether the will made reasonable financial provision, followed by what provision should be made if it did not. The factors in section 3(1) applied to both stages.
2. Meaning of maintenance. For a non-spouse applicant, reasonable financial provision meant what it was reasonable in all the circumstances to receive for maintenance under section 1(2)(b). Maintenance concerned everyday living expenses and did not extend to everything it would be desirable for the claimant to have. It could nevertheless be provided by a lump sum, including one used to obtain housing. The court applied the explanation in Re Dennis (Deceased) [1981] 2 AR 140, as cited with approval in Ilott v The Blue Cross and others.
3. Adult child claims. Need was necessary but not sufficient. A qualifying relationship did not automatically establish entitlement. The court considered the guidance in Ilott v The Blue Cross and others that, for an adult child capable of independent living, something more than blood relationship may be required, although a moral claim was not an invariably necessary condition.
4. Application. The will did not make reasonable financial provision for the claimant, who had substantial needs arising from severe mental illness and inability to support herself. However, the estate was modest and priority had to be given to securing the mother’s care costs. The claimant’s prolonged estrangement from her parents and the absence of continuing parental financial responsibility were relevant, even though illness materially explained her conduct. The court therefore declined to fund a home or provide a lifelong income fund.
5. Costs liability. The court did not follow Re Clarke [2019] EWHC 1193 and 1194 (Ch) in excluding any allowance for a conditional fee success fee. It adopted the case-specific approach in Bullock v Denton, allowing £16,750 because the liability was personal to the claimant, could not be recovered as costs, and otherwise threatened to leave primary needs unmet. The award totalled £138,918, comprising therapy, income support for three years, loss of universal credit, replacement goods and car costs, a rental deposit and the cautious CFA allowance. The court exercised its power under section 9 to facilitate the provision.