Hope Community Church (Wymondham) v Phelan & Ors

For the purposes of enfranchisement under the Places of Worship (Enfranchisement) Act 1920, “trust” is not confined to a trust in the strict legal sense. It may include an incorporated charity whose constitution legally requires its assets to be applied exclusively for charitable purposes and which is therefore analogous to a trustee.

The premises must be held on terms providing for use as a place of public religious worship, whether alongside other purposes, and must in fact be used consistently with those terms. The requirement is directed to the purpose for which the particular premises are held. A lease and the charity’s constitution may be read together to establish the necessary purpose trust.

The claimant, an incorporated charitable company and Christian church, held a 30-year lease of premises used as a church and community centre. It sought a declaration that it could acquire the freehold under section 1 of the Places of Worship (Enfranchisement) Act 1920.

The defendants contended that section 1 required a trust in the strict legal sense, which did not exist because the claimant was the beneficial owner of its assets. They also argued that any relevant trust would breach the lease’s alienation covenant prohibiting the premises being held for another person. The issues were whether the statutory concept of trust extended to an incorporated charity and whether the lease and constitution satisfied the statutory requirements.

1. Declaration granted. The claimant was entitled to acquire the freehold of the premises under the Places of Worship (Enfranchisement) Act 1920.
2. Section 1(1) should be construed purposively. The statutory reference to premises held “upon trust to be used for the purposes of a place of worship” is sufficiently broad to include a charitable company whose constitution imposes binding restrictions requiring its assets to be used exclusively for charitable purposes. Such a company may hold assets as a trustee in the broad, analogous sense, although it is not a trustee in strict law.
3. The statutory purpose was to enable religious bodies to obtain secure tenure. Excluding incorporated charities would create an irrational distinction between religious bodies using corporate and trust structures. The statutory language and the legislative background supported the broader construction.
4. The section requires both: (i) premises held on express or implied terms providing for their use as a place of public religious worship, whether or not in conjunction with other purposes; and (ii) actual use in accordance with those terms. The focus is on the purpose for which the particular premises are held, not merely their actual use.
5. Reading the claimant’s memorandum and articles together with the lease, the claimant was required to use the premises as a church and community centre, with ancillary and associated uses permitted. The claimant’s charitable objects included advancing the Christian faith, its assets were restricted to its charitable objects, and the premises were in fact used for public worship.
6. The alienation covenant in paragraph 16.2.2 of Schedule 3 to the lease did not prevent enfranchisement. In its factual and contractual context, it could not sensibly be construed as placing the incorporated charity in breach from the date of the original grant.
7. The judge additionally observed that it was arguable that premises held on terms merely permitting use as a place of worship, while allowing exclusive alternative uses, might not qualify. That issue did not arise on the lease in question.