Oran Environmental Solutions Ltd & Anor v QBE Insurance (Europe) Ltd & Anor

The claimant sued its insurance broker for professional negligence arising from alleged loss under an insurance policy. The sole issue before the court was whether the claim form issued on 21 December 2018 was validly served within its extended period of validity. The court applied the Civil Procedure Rules, in particular CPR 7.5 (service of a claim form), CPR 6.3 and related rules, and Practice Direction 6A para 4.1, and concluded that the fourth consent order extending time to 4pm on 6 January 2020 was properly to be read as extending the time for taking the steps required by CPR 7.5. The court therefore held that posting the claim form and particulars by special delivery shortly before 4pm on 6 January 2020 satisfied the step required by CPR 7.5 and amounted to valid service within the extended period. The court also held that service on the defendant’s solicitors was ineffective absent evidence they were authorised to accept service, and that service by email requires prior written consent and a nominated address under Practice Direction 6A.

Background and parties: The claim arises from a fire at the claimants' premises and an insurance claim. The first claimant alleged that, because of the second defendant broker's negligence, the insured payment was substantially reduced. The claim form was issued on 21 December 2018 to preserve limitation. The question was whether the claim form was validly served within its period of validity as extended by a series of consent orders ending with an order requiring service by 4pm on 6 January 2020.

Nature of the applications / relief sought: The second defendant applied that the court had no jurisdiction because the claim form had not been validly served during its temporal validity. Contingently, if that application succeeded, the claimant sought an extension of time under CPR 7.6 for retrospective validation of service.

Issues framed: (i) Whether the consent order extending time to 4pm on 6 January 2020 should be construed as extending time to complete the step required by CPR 7.5 (posting etc.) or whether it required actual receipt (physical service) by 4pm; (ii) whether service on the defendant's solicitors was effective without written authority to accept service; (iii) whether service by email was effective without prior written consent and a nominated address under Practice Direction 6A; and (iv) in the alternative, whether time should be extended under CPR 7.6.

Court's reasoning and findings: The court analysed CPR 7.5 and CPR 6.3–6.9 and Practice Direction 6A para 4.1 and considered authorities including T&L Sugars, Paxton Jones and Howard Kennedy. It concluded that the natural construction of the consent order was to extend time to take the step required by CPR 7.5, and that service of the claim form and particulars by posting/special delivery shortly before the expiry of the extended period satisfied that requirement. The court held that service upon the defendant's solicitors was ineffective because there was no written indication that those solicitors were authorised to accept service. The court also held that sending documents to an email address without prior written consent and a nominated address did not effect valid service under PD 6A. Because valid service was established, the defendant's jurisdictional application failed and was dismissed. The claimant's contingent CPR 7.6 application was not decided on the merits but the judge stated that, had it been necessary, she would have refused it given the claimant's pre-issue and pre-service conduct.

Subsidiary findings: The court emphasised the strictness with which CPR 7.6 is applied and the weight to be given to a claimant's earlier failures to take timely steps when considering retrospective extensions.

The defendant's jurisdictional challenge was dismissed. The court held that the consent order extending time to 4pm on 6 January 2020 should be read as extending time to complete the step required by CPR 7.5, and that the claimant effected valid service of the claim form and particulars within the extended period by posting/special delivery shortly before that deadline. The claimant's contingent CPR 7.6 application was unnecessary and, had it been required, would have been refused.