Collier v Williams

When a defendant or insurer gives a solicitor’s address for service, a claim form may be served there by a permitted non-personal method. Written notification from the solicitor under CPR 6.4(2) is required only to prevent personal service. For CPR 6.5(6), no solicitor is “acting” unless the claimant knows that the solicitor can be served.

A “last known residence” must be an address where the defendant once resided; belief alone cannot convert another address into a residence. The court indicated that knowledge means actual knowledge or knowledge obtainable by reasonable diligence.

An order refusing a without-notice paper application may be reconsidered under CPR 3.3(5), but repeat applications will usually be abusive. CPR 3.1(7) is not an alternative appeal. On an in-time application under CPR 7.6(2), the strength of the reason for failing to serve is critical. No reason or a very weak reason will normally require refusal.

The court gave a single judgment in four appeals concerning service of claim forms and extensions of time. In Collier v Williams, the defendant challenged service on solicitors whom her insurer had nominated to accept service. In Marshall and Rankine v Maggs, the claimants had posted the claim form to an address where the defendant had never resided and sought an extension of time.

In Leeson v Marsden, a clinical-negligence claimant sought to renew a without-notice application after an extension had been refused on paper. In Glass v Surrendran, a personal-injury claimant obtained an extension on a renewed application after the original paper application had been refused.

The principal issues were the construction of CPR 6.4 and 6.5, the jurisdiction to reconsider paper applications, the limits of CPR 3.1(7), and the proper approach to extensions under CPR 7.6.

1. Disposition. The appeal in Collier v Williams was dismissed. The appeals in Marshall and Rankine v Maggs and Leeson v Marsden were also dismissed. The defendant’s appeal in Glass v Surrendran was allowed, and the extension for service was set aside.

2. CPR 6.4 concerns personal service. CPR 6.4(2) prevents personal service where an authorised solicitor has notified the serving party in writing. It does not govern service by post or the other methods addressed by CPR 6.5. Consequently, when a defendant or insurer gives a solicitor’s address for service, a claim form may validly be served there by a permitted non-personal method even though the solicitor has not separately confirmed authority in writing. The approach in Nanglegan v Royal Free Hampstead NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 127 was followed, and the contrary reasoning in Knight v Alberto-Culver Company Limited was disapproved.

3. For CPR 6.5(6), “no solicitor acting” means no solicitor acting in a capacity which permits service on that solicitor. A claimant may therefore use the table in CPR 6.5(6) where a solicitor acts generally but has not been identified as authorised to accept service. However, an address cannot be a defendant’s “last known residence” if the defendant has never resided there. The court indicated, obiter, that where the defendant formerly resided at the address, knowledge means actual knowledge or knowledge obtainable through reasonable diligence.

4. A paper application dealt with under CPR 23.8(c) is treated by the relevant practice direction as an order made on the court’s own initiative. An affected applicant may therefore seek reconsideration under CPR 3.3(5). Such reconsideration should ordinarily occur at a hearing. A further application after reconsideration will usually be struck out as an abuse unless based on substantially different material. CPR 3.1(7) cannot be used as an alternative appeal. It should ordinarily be exercised only after a material change of circumstances or where the earlier court was materially misled.

5. CPR 7.6(2) contains no threshold conditions equivalent to CPR 7.6(3). The conditions in CPR 7.6(3) remain relevant but are not determinative of an in-time application. Applying Hashtroodi v Hancock [2004] EWCA Civ 652, the critical inquiry is the reason for failing to serve within four months. A strong reason favours an extension; no reason or a very weak reason makes an extension most unlikely. Solicitor error, delay in preparing particulars, an outstanding application, lack of prejudice, or the value of the claim did not justify extensions in the appeals before the court.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2006] EWCA Civ 20, dismissed the appeals in Collier v Williams, Marshall and Rankine v Maggs and Leeson v Marsden. It allowed the defendant’s appeal in Glass v Surrendran and set aside the extension of time.

• Poole County Court: Deputy District Judge Mathews dismissed the defendant’s application to strike out Collier v Williams. The appeal was transferred directly to the Court of Appeal, which affirmed that decision.

• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Gray J allowed the defendant’s appeal from Master Eyre in Marshall and Rankine v Maggs. The Court of Appeal ultimately dismissed the claimants’ appeal.

• High Court, Bristol District Registry: His Honour Judge Darlow allowed the defendants’ appeals from District Judge Singleton in Leeson v Marsden. The Court of Appeal dismissed the claimant’s appeal.

• Manchester County Court: His Honour Judge Tetlow upheld an extension of time in Glass v Surrendran. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision and set the extension aside.