Lifestyle Equities CV & Anor v Santa Monica Polo Club Ltd & Ors

A first-instance court should revisit a judgment only in exceptional circumstances and in accordance with the overriding objective. Fresh evidence must be sufficiently cogent to justify reopening the decision, particularly where doing so would require a further hearing. The court should consider finality, proportionality, delay, the availability of an appeal, and the principles reflected in the Ladd v Marshall criteria. A party cannot use a review application as a substitute for an appeal or a second opportunity to present evidence. Under the costs jurisdiction, the court identifies the successful party, considers all relevant conduct and offers, and may reflect success on a discrete issue by discounting costs according to the time and significance of that issue.

The claimants had obtained judgment following a second trial, including substantial awards against the fifth and twelfth defendants. The fifth defendant applied to revisit a finding that a personal loan remained unpaid, relying on new material. He also sought variation or a stay of an earlier adjournment costs order, permission to appeal on several grounds, and a stay of payment on account of costs.

The court considered whether the new evidence justified revisiting the judgment, whether CPR 3.1(7) permitted variation of the earlier order, whether permission to appeal should be granted, and how the trial and application costs should be allocated.

1. Application to revisit judgment. The new material did not establish repayment of the loan. It was unexplained, unsupported by the fifth defendant’s own evidence or records, inconsistent in parts, and available before trial. Reopening the trial would have required further examination and disclosure. Applying the approach in Charlesworth v Relay Roads [2000] 1 WLR 230, the guidance in In Re L [2013] UKSC 8, and the more relaxed application of Ladd v Marshall, the court declined to revisit its finding. The application was dismissed.
2. Costs. The claimants were the clear winners. Their failure on the principal quantum point was a reasonable legal argument and did not amount to exaggeration. The defendants’ low settlement offer and litigation conduct were relevant. The appropriate order was that the defendants pay 90% of the claimants’ costs of the second trial. The adjournment application costs were summarily assessed at £15,000. A reasonable payment on account, after applying the 90% reduction and allowing for costs orders in the defendants’ favour, was £55,000.
3. Variation and stay of adjournment costs order. Under CPR 3.1(7), the jurisdiction is principled and normally arises only after a material change of circumstances or where the facts underlying the original order were misstated. The fifth defendant identified no misstated fact. The application was also unjustifiably late and sought to revisit matters suitable for appeal. Variation and a stay were refused. A stay pending a stay of another order was in principle inappropriate, particularly after permission to appeal the original order had been refused.
4. Permission to appeal. Permission was granted to the claimants on a point of law with a real prospect of success. Permission was refused to the defendants. Their proposed grounds substantially revisited factual findings and relied on evidence available at trial, whereas the claimants’ proposed appeal concerned a self-contained point of principle. A mere inability to pay did not justify a stay of payment on account. That application was also refused.

The judgment records an earlier judgment in the same proceedings, reported at [2020] EWHC 688 (Ch). The present decision determined post-judgment applications and applications for permission to appeal. Permission to appeal was granted to the claimants on a specified point of law and refused to the defendants.