Ridley v Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC

Where an application fails, costs will generally follow the event, subject to reductions for costs genuinely wasted by amendments. Summary assessment may be deferred where the evidence needed to quantify any reduction is incomplete. Any question whether costs should be set off against an existing judgment should ordinarily be determined when the costs order is quantified and payment falls to be considered.

Permission to appeal requires a real, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. Abuse of process and delay questions may require assessment of the facts as a whole. A bilateral treaty service procedure does not automatically justify alternative service; unusual facts may nevertheless constitute a good reason for alternative service.

The judgment addressed consequential issues following an earlier decision on the Bank’s application to set aside proceedings brought by Mr Ridley. The court considered costs, summary assessment, set-off against an existing judgment, permission to appeal, further pleadings, the case management conference, possible allocation to the Shorter Trial Scheme or London Circuit Commercial Court, and disclosure steps pending the case management conference.

The central questions were whether the unsuccessful Bank should pay the costs of its application, whether permission to appeal should be granted, and what procedural directions should follow.

1. Costs. The Bank’s application had failed, so the starting point under CPR Part 44 was that the Bank should pay Mr Ridley’s costs. The court rejected the arguments that the application was unnecessary or that its costs were thrown away by amendments. The application would have been made on the merits even without the need for service out, and it would have failed on the unamended claim. However, any additional costs caused by the amendments could properly reduce the recoverable amount.
2. Summary assessment and set-off. Summary assessment was deferred to the case management conference. The claimed costs appeared reasonable and proportionate, but the court lacked evidence to quantify any reduction attributable to amendments. Set-off was also left for the case management conference, when a quantified costs order would permit the court to determine when payment should occur and whether payment should be ordered while the Bank held an outstanding judgment against Mr Ridley.
3. Permission to appeal. The test was whether the Bank had a real, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. That test was not met. The court rejected the argument that abuse of process could be decided without a fact-dependent inquiry, referring to Johnson v Gore-Wood. The court had considered overall delay, not merely the period between an enforcement step and English proceedings, and regarded the issue as unsuitable for determination in the abstract. It had also held that alternative service was justified by the unusual combination of bilateral treaty delay and Mr Ridley’s imprisonment. That conclusion did not establish a general rule that treaty service always supplies a good reason for alternative service.
4. Directions. The Bank was allowed until 23 June to file a defence and Mr Ridley until 7 July to serve any reply. A case management conference was directed before the end of July. Further steps were not to prejudice any jurisdictional challenge. The parties were directed to liaise on a disclosure review document, including an agreed list of issues and proposed disclosure models.

Permission to appeal was refused.