Mitchell, R (On the Application Of) v London Borough of Islington

The amended Housing Act 1996 provides an exhaustive code for ending the interim accommodation duty under section 188. Where an authority decides that an applicant is not in priority need, that decision alone does not end the duty. The authority must give the notification required by section 188(1ZA): either that no relief duty is owed, or that, when the relief duty ends, no duty will arise under section 190 or section 193. A section 184 decision letter is insufficient unless it communicates the specified decision. Statutory notification requirements are not mere technicalities where they protect applicants from misunderstanding the continuing relief duty.

The claimant sought judicial review of the London Borough of Islington’s decision to end temporary accommodation after it concluded that he was not in priority need. The authority had notified him of its section 184 decision and review rights, but did not expressly notify him of the decision required by section 188(1ZA)(b). The claimant argued that the interim duty under section 188(1) therefore continued. The authority relied on the terms of its letter, the statutory scheme and earlier authorities concerning notification requirements. The central issue was when and how the amended interim accommodation duty ended.

1. The claim succeeded on the principal issue. The court declared that the authority’s letter of 5 October 2019 did not bring its duty under section 188(1) of the Housing Act 1996 to an end. No quashing order or accommodation order was required in light of the later notification provided by the authority.
2. Section 188(3), read with section 188(1ZA), governs cessation of the interim duty where section 188(2A) does not apply. A decision under section 184 that an applicant is not in priority need is only the threshold condition for section 188(1ZA); it is not sufficient by itself to end the duty.
3. Under section 188(1ZA)(a), the duty ends when the authority notifies the applicant that it does not owe a duty under section 189B(2). Under section 188(1ZA)(b), applicable in other cases, the authority must notify the applicant of its decision that, when the section 189B(2) duty ends, it will owe no duty under section 190 or section 193. The notification must communicate that specific statutory decision.
4. The requirement reflects the amended statutory scheme. The section 188 accommodation duty and the section 189B(2) relief duty may continue in parallel, and ending the former does not necessarily end the latter. Specific notification reduces the risk that an applicant will wrongly assume that both duties have ended.
5. The reasoning in Omar v Birmingham City Council [2007] HLR 639 did not govern. It concerned different statutory provisions and a different question. The caution in Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 755; [2011] PTSR 11 supported care against extending Omar beyond its context. R(Faizi) v Brent LBC [2015] EWHC 2449 (Admin) was likewise distinguishable because it concerned the unamended legislation and a different issue.
6. The Secretary of State’s Code of Guidance could not alter the statutory requirements. Paragraph 15.9 could not properly be read as meaning that a finding of no priority need automatically ended the section 188 duty.
7. The ordinary costs rule applied. The claimant was awarded the costs of the principal issue, subject to the exclusion of costs relating to the abandoned or different preliminary arguments.