Fantini v Scrutton & Ors

A joint tenancy is not severed by a written notice unless the notice is effectively served in accordance with the statutory requirements. Where registered post is used, the deeming provision does not operate if the letter is returned undelivered. An uncommunicated declaration will not ordinarily operate on the sender’s own share. An administrative application to the Land Registry, made on the mistaken assumption that severance has already occurred, does not itself sever the joint tenancy. A Land Registry notice explaining a restriction is not, without sufficiently unambiguous terms, a notice of severance. Where representative proceedings are reasonably and necessarily brought to resolve an impasse in estate administration, the executor’s costs may be paid from the relevant estate funds.

The claimant, acting as executor of Iris Fantini’s estate, sought directions concerning the proceeds of sale of a property formerly owned jointly by Iris and her daughter Gloria. Gloria had signed a notice purporting to sever the joint tenancy, which was sent by registered post but returned undelivered. Her solicitors later applied to the Land Registry, resulting in a restriction and a standard Land Registry letter being sent to Iris.

The court had to determine whether the joint tenancy had been severed by the notice, by acts operating on Gloria’s share, or by the Land Registry correspondence. It also had to determine whether the claimant’s costs should be paid from the proceeds held pending determination.

1. The claim succeeded. The joint tenancy was not severed, and the proceeds held by the solicitors were payable to Iris’s estate. The claimant’s costs were also ordered to be paid from the relevant proceeds.
2. Under Law of Property Act 1925, section 36(2), a written notice of severance must be effectively served. Section 196(4) did not deem service where the registered letter was returned undelivered. Applying WX Investments v Begg [2002] 1 WLR 2849, the notice was not served.
3. The notice did not constitute an act operating on Gloria’s own share. It had not been communicated to Iris and there were no other relevant acts. The court applied Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch 429, which treated an uncommunicated, conditional or unclear declaration as insufficient.
4. The Land Registry application was an administrative application to register a restriction, not a court process or notice communicated to the co-owner. Although Re Draper’s Conveyance [1969] 1 Ch 486 and Quigley v Masterson [2011] EWHC 2529 (Ch) recognised relevant court applications and evidence as capable of severing a joint tenancy, they did not govern this materially different administrative process.
5. The Land Registry’s template letter and explanatory notes informed Iris of the restriction and its consequences. Read in context, they did not amount to sufficiently unambiguous notice of severance.
6. The claim was properly brought to resolve an impasse in the administration of the estates. Applying Re Buckton [1907] 2 Ch 406, the costs were necessarily and properly incurred and could be paid from the proceeds. The court observed that, in future representative claims, the costs issue should ordinarily be raised at an early directions or disposal hearing.