Bhattacharya & Anor v Omni Capital Partners Ltd

A statutory claim for repayment of money paid under an unenforceable agreement is subject to the six-year limitation period in section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980 where the right to repayment arises only under statute. The cause of action accrues when the relevant payment is made, not when a later declaration of unenforceability is granted. A declaration should not be entertained where it is academic, serves no useful purpose and there is no real and present dispute. Agreed facts and self-contained legal issues may properly be determined summarily where there is no compelling reason for a trial.

The claimants sought declarations that two loan agreements were unenforceable under sections 26 and 28 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, together with repayment of interest and fees. The defendant applied under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 24.2 to strike out or obtain summary judgment concerning payments made under the first loan agreement before 9 August 2013.

The parties agreed the relevant facts. The central issues were whether the repayment claim was statute barred, when time began to run, whether a declaration concerning the first agreement served any useful purpose, and whether any compelling reason required a trial.

1. The court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the repayment claim concerning the first loan agreement. The claims were based on sections 26 and 28 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and the repayment remedy arose only under that statute.
2. The six-year limitation period in section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 applied. The court considered by analogy Rahman v Sterling Credit Ltd, [2001] 1 WLR 496, Nolan v Wright, [2009] 3 All ER 823, and Patel v Patel, [2009] EWHC 3264. The distinction between a longer limitation period for a declaration and the shorter period for recovery of money supported that conclusion.
3. Time began to run on the dates on which the relevant payments were made. The claimants’ payments under the first agreement were made more than six years before proceedings were issued, so the repayment claim for £867,239 was time barred.
4. The declaration concerning the first agreement was also disposed of summarily. It was academic, served no useful purpose, involved no real and present dispute, and raised no sufficient public-interest or other reason for determination. The surviving declaration concerning the second agreement meant that the wider public-interest argument did not justify retaining it.
5. The agreed facts made the issues self-contained questions of law. There was no real prospect of success and no compelling reason for a trial. The claim for repayment under the first agreement and the related declaration therefore fell away.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.