PQ (A Child : Anonymity) v Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust

An anonymity order may be necessary even at a liability-only trial where identifying the child would create a jigsaw effect that substantially restricts reporting of later settlement or damages-approval proceedings. The court must assess whether derogation from open justice is necessary, rather than undertake an unstructured balance between privacy and freedom of expression. The protective function of an approval hearing, and the fact that protected parties cannot settle privately, do not by themselves justify anonymity at a liability trial. However, the serious invasion of privacy caused by publishing highly personal medical information remains relevant. A limited restriction on identifying the child may therefore be justified where it preserves fuller reporting of the proceedings as a whole.

The claimant, a child and protected party represented by her father and litigation friend, brought a liability-only clinical negligence claim against an NHS trust arising from injuries sustained around her birth. The claim concerned severe brain injury and cerebral palsy.

The claimant applied for anonymity for herself and her family. The court considered the approach in JXMX v Dartford & Gravesham NHS Trust, reported at [2015] 1 WLR 3747, and whether its reasoning concerning anonymity at settlement-approval hearings applied to a liability trial. The central issue was whether anonymity was necessary when balancing open justice, privacy and the press’s ability to report later proceedings.

1. Application granted. The claimant and her family were anonymised.
2. The ratio of JXMX v Dartford & Gravesham NHS Trust was confined to approval hearings. Its first rationale, that the court’s protective function at an approval hearing differs from its ordinary dispute-resolution function, did not apply to a liability trial. Its third rationale, concerning the inability of children and protected parties to settle privately, also did not apply because adult litigants whose claims are not settled are likewise required to litigate to obtain damages.
3. The privacy rationale did apply. Publication of highly personal medical information involved a serious invasion of the claimant’s and her family’s privacy. The issue engaged the tension between open justice and the Convention rights of the child, family and press.
4. The relevant question was whether derogation from open justice was necessary. That requirement had to be applied strictly. The court was not required to choose mechanically between anonymity at the liability stage and unrestricted reporting at that stage.
5. The jigsaw effect was decisive. If the claimant succeeded and the liability proceedings identified her, later reports of approval or damages proceedings could be associated with her identity, materially restricting the court’s ability to protect her privacy. Anonymity at the liability stage preserved the press’s ability to report the proceedings, including any later liability and quantum proceedings, without identifying the claimant.
6. The court could not anticipate whether the claim would reach quantification when deciding the application. In all the circumstances, anonymity was necessary and the limited restriction on reporting the claimant’s name was justified.