Spicer v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

In defamation proceedings, a defendant is generally entitled to justify the meaning which the claimant has placed on the words complained of. A prior criminal acquittal does not necessarily prevent a civil truth defence. An acquittal ordinarily establishes only that criminal liability was not proved, rather than positive findings about the claimant’s conduct. Abuse of process requires a principled assessment of relitigation or collateral attack, including whether later proceedings would undermine an earlier decision, cause manifest unfairness, or bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The defendant’s common-law entitlement to justify the publication, reinforced by Article 10 ECHR, is a powerful countervailing consideration. In defamation proceedings, a claimant replying to a detailed truth defence must address the material facts relied upon, rather than provide bare denials.

The claimant brought defamation proceedings concerning an article published on the Metropolitan Police website. The article stated that he had taken part in a car race, had driven at high speed, had failed to stop after an accident, and had been prosecuted, although acquitted of causing death and serious injury by dangerous driving and convicted of careless driving.

Following the meaning ruling of Warby J, reported at [2019] EWHC 1439 (QB), the defendant pleaded substantial truth under section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013, together with statutory privilege. The claimant applied to strike out the truth defence as an abuse of process. The defendant applied for an order requiring a properly particularised Reply.

1. Abuse of process. The application to strike out the truth defence was dismissed. Abuse of process is not an open-ended discretion. The court must apply the relevant principles, including relitigation and collateral attack, using a broad merits-based assessment.
2. The relitigation doctrine does not make every matter which could have been raised earlier abusive. Relevant factors included that the parties were different, the Commissioner and the CPS were not to be treated as the same party, and the criminal jury’s acquittal did not amount to positive factual findings about the claimant’s conduct. The criminal and civil proceedings also applied different standards of proof.
3. The proposed truth defence was not a collateral attack on the criminal decision. The criminal charges concerned whether the claimant’s dangerous driving contributed to the death or injury. The civil meaning concerned his conduct before the accident and whether it gave reasonable grounds for suspicion. A civil finding for the defendant would not positively conflict with the criminal acquittal.
4. The defamation context reinforced that conclusion. A defendant is entitled to justify any meaning which the claimant has placed on the words complained of. Preventing the defendant from attempting to prove truth would interfere with freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. Any possible Article 8 interest of the claimant would not outweigh that entitlement.
5. Pleading application. The claimant’s Reply failed to comply with Practice Direction 53B because it gave bare denials to a detailed truth defence. The claimant was directed to amend the Reply to state his case in response to the facts relied upon. The judge expressed the provisional view that a claimant should ordinarily identify the basis of any challenge to a detailed privilege defence, but no order was sought on that issue.