Ameyaw v McGoldrick & Ors

An application for recusal based on apparent bias must be assessed by identifying all relevant circumstances and asking whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. Ordinary professional relationships between judges and barristers, including former membership of the same chambers and a former pupil-supervisor relationship, will not ordinarily satisfy that test. The observer must consider the legal culture and professional standards governing judges and barristers. Criticism of a judge, or a complaint made about the judge, does not by itself establish apparent bias. A recusal application should be refused where a reasonable explanation consistent with proper judicial conduct dispels the alleged appearance of bias.

The claimant applied for Mrs Justice Steyn to recuse herself from determining the defendants’ application. The application was made without a hearing under CPR 23.8(b).

The claimant relied on her professional relationship with the defendants’ counsel, who had been her pupil and a member of her former chambers. She also relied on the judge’s conduct during an earlier hearing, when the claimant became unwell and later required hospital treatment, and on a complaint made by the claimant’s mother.

The central issue was whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility of bias.

The recusal application was dismissed.

1. Applicable test. The court applied the approach stated in In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No.2) and endorsed in Porter v Magill. The court must ascertain all circumstances bearing on the suggestion of bias and ask whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. The threshold is objective and concerns apparent, rather than actual, bias.
2. Professional relationship. Former membership of the same chambers as counsel falls within the circumstances identified in Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd which do not ordinarily found a sustainable objection. The professional relationship between the judiciary and the Bar is mediated by recognised professional standards. Consistently with Taylor v Lawrence and Watts v Watts, neither former membership of chambers nor the fact that counsel had previously been the judge’s pupil created a real possibility of bias. The circumstances were particularly insufficient because the judge was a full-time judge, no longer belonged to the chambers, and had supervised counsel rather than being supervised by him.
3. Earlier hearing and complaint. The fair-minded and informed observer would consider possible explanations for the judge’s conduct. A reasonable explanation for the judge not commenting on the claimant’s collapse before leaving court was that she had not known that the claimant had collapsed. The fact that the claimant’s mother had made complaints likewise did not create apparent bias. The court applied the guidance in Dobbs v Tridos Bank NV that judges should resist recusal merely because a litigant has criticised them.
4. Considering the grounds separately and cumulatively, there was no real danger of bias and no real ground for doubt requiring recusal.