Walker, R (On the Application Of) v Bath and North East Somerset Council

A common-law duty to give reasons for granting planning permission may arise from the overall context, particularly where permission departs from the development plan or important protective policies, faces substantial opposition, and conflicts with the planning officer’s recommendation. No single factor is invariably required, and a major departure is not a necessary threshold.

Where the duty arises, reasons must address the principal points of difference, including the relevant advantages and disadvantages and why the benefits outweigh the identified harm. A committee cannot be assumed to have rejected an officer’s reasoning merely because it granted permission. An asserted enabling-development benefit requires a rational evidential link to the development. Bare or questionable assertions cannot outweigh multiple conflicts with the development plan.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Council’s decision to grant planning permission and listed building consent for redevelopment at the Belvoir Castle public house in Bath. The proposal involved demolishing a listed skittle alley, constructing residential studio apartments, and refurbishing the public house and community facilities.

The officer recommended refusal because of conflicts concerning flood risk and the sequential test, heritage assets, residential amenity, parking and ecology. The Development Management Committee nevertheless resolved to permit the applications, and permission was subsequently issued. The Council conceded the failure-to-give-reasons ground. The interested developer opposed the claim. The issues included whether reasons were required and adequate, whether the pub’s future was an immaterial consideration, whether consultation on an updated ecology report was unfair, and whether the decision was irrational.

1. Ground 1 allowed. The common-law duty to give reasons arose from the circumstances viewed cumulatively. The decision departed from the development plan and the officer’s strong recommendation, concerned listed and heritage assets in a Conservation Area and World Heritage Site, and followed substantial public opposition. The principles in Oakley [2017] EWCA Civ 71 and CPRE (Kent) [2017] UKSC 79 were not confined to Green Belt or similarly major developments. A major departure from the development plan was illustrative rather than essential.
2. The reasons had to address the main points of difference between the committee and the officer. The minutes contained no adequate consideration of the sequential test, the failure to undertake it, or the relationship between that issue and flood risk. A councillor’s statement that he did not think the site would flood could not substitute for reasons addressing the officer’s distinct conclusion that the sequential test had not been performed. The minutes also failed adequately to explain the planning balance, the claimed link between the apartments and the pub’s future, or the parking concerns.
3. The asserted future of the pub was not rationally established as an enabling-development benefit. The Carter Jonas report did not demonstrate an intrinsic link between the residential development and the pub’s long-term viability, and local knowledge did not supply that missing evidence. The consideration was therefore immaterial on the facts.
4. Ground 3 failed. The claimant had received and commented fully on the updated ecology report. There was no evidence that other objectors were materially prejudiced by the absence of further consultation. The approach in Wainwright [2001] EWCA Civ 2062 was applicable.
5. Ground 4 succeeded. The claimed benefits were largely assertions, some demonstrably questionable, and could not rationally outweigh the multiple identified departures from the development plan. The decisions to grant planning permission and listed building consent were quashed. The court also rejected the argument under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 that the outcome was highly likely to have been the same.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. No earlier decision in the same proceedings is stated in the judgment.