Wynne-Finch & Ors v Natural Resources Body for Wales

Minerals reservations are construed objectively in their contractual and factual context. The words “mines and minerals” do not automatically include every substance capable of being described as a mineral. Relevant considerations include the nature and ubiquity of the substance, its use and value, the vernacular meaning at the date of the grant, the commercial purpose, the parties’ relative positions and any working powers.

Common local mudstone, including associated interbedded sandstone and shale, was outside the reservations considered. Where title to surface and substrata has not been severed, adverse possession of the surface and its ordinary use may establish title to the underlying material. Contractual enclosure licences did not create or preserve a separate estate in the substrata against successors.

The claimants, trustees of the Williams-Wynn 1987 Settlement, claimed corporeal or incorporeal rights to stone and other material beneath 40 forestry titles managed by the defendant, Natural Resources Body for Wales.

The claims arose from four categories of title: post-First World War conveyances containing minerals reservations, an 1864 Crown grant, private enclosure agreements, and awards under the Arwystli Enclosure Act 1816. The defendant denied the claimed rights and relied alternatively on adverse possession.

The trial concerned liability only. The central issues were the scope of the relevant reservations, whether the category C agreements created enforceable rights in the substrata, and whether adverse possession had extinguished any surviving title.

1. Construction of reservations. The expression “mines and minerals” is not a term with a fixed meaning. Its construction depends on the instrument, the factual matrix, the nature of the material, its use and value, the commercial background, the parties’ relative positions and the working powers granted. A broad literal meaning is not applied automatically.
2. Categories A and D. Mudstone, including the interbedded sandstone and shale found on the defendant’s land, was ubiquitous, of low value and limited use. It was not exceptional in use, value or character and would not have been regarded in 1816 or 1919 as material worth commercially extracting. The reservations therefore did not include it. The practical consequences of the claim, including the need to disturb substrata for buildings, fencing, roads and forestry, reinforced that conclusion.
3. Category B. The 1864 Crown grant was construed strictly against the grantee and did not pass the local mudstone. The express reference to “substrata” in another parcel supported that conclusion.
4. Category C. The enclosure agreements were contractual licences permitting enclosure and cultivation. They did not convey an estate or interest in land. Their attempted obligations could not run with the land so as to bind successors. The defendant’s predecessors acquired a fresh, undifferentiated title by adverse possession, extending in principle to the substrata.
5. Adverse possession. The ordinary requirements were factual possession and an intention to possess. Forestry operations, including planting, harvesting, road and track construction, maintenance, ramps and related quarrying, objectively manifested possession of the mudstone within the relevant forested areas. The defendant had possessed for more than 12 years. Any mistake about ownership did not negate the necessary intention.
6. The claimants retained corporeal rights to minerals falling within the reservations in categories A, B and D, subject to mapping issues, but not to the mudstone. If that conclusion were wrong, adverse possession would nevertheless have established the defendant’s title to the mudstone to the depth required for its forestry operations. The defendant was not liable for trespass, conversion or breach of Convention rights.