Vincent & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Work And Pensions

A welfare-benefit measure is unlawful under Article 14 only where the relevant difference in treatment lacks objective and reasonable justification. In welfare-benefit cases, the applicable standard is whether the measure is manifestly without reasonable foundation. That standard requires careful scrutiny of the State’s reasons, but permits broad rules reflecting economic and political judgments. A repayment-on-sale condition attached to a mortgage-interest loan was justified by the legitimate aims of recovering public expenditure, maintaining scheme sustainability and ending support when the original property was sold. The absence of an exemption or portability discretion for disabled recipients was therefore not discriminatory.

Two conjoined judicial review claims challenged Regulation 16 of the Loans For Mortgage Interest Regulations 2017. The Vincent claim was brought by severely disabled adults cared for by partners receiving Carer’s Allowance, and by a dependent child. The JD claim was brought by a severely disabled adult whose accommodation might become unsuitable and who might need to move closer to family or to more accessible premises.

The principal challenge was to the requirement that the outstanding loan become immediately repayable when the property was sold. The claimants argued that the scheme unlawfully discriminated under Article 14 read with A1P1 and Article 8, and that the public sector equality duty had been breached. The central issues were whether the relevant cohorts had an Article 14 status or were in a significantly different situation, and whether the repayment-on-sale requirement was objectively justified.

1. Claims dismissed. Neither the repayment obligation nor the repayment-on-sale requirement breached Article 14 read with A1P1 or Article 8. The parallel Equality Act claims also failed.
2. For ordinary Article 14 discrimination the relevant questions were whether the facts fell within the ambit of a Convention right, whether there was less favourable treatment of a relevantly similar comparator, whether the difference was based on an Article 14 status, and whether it was objectively and reasonably justified. For Thlimmenos discrimination, the focus was whether the claimants were in a significantly different situation and, if so, whether the failure to treat them differently was justified.
3. In the welfare-benefit context, the question was whether the measure was manifestly without reasonable foundation. That approach applied whether the challenge was framed as indirect or Thlimmenos discrimination. The requirement still called for careful scrutiny of the State’s reasons.
4. The Vincent cohort was not shown to be in a significantly different position from other long-term LMI recipients. Many other recipients were unable to work, lacked alternative funds and might have substantial care or accommodation needs. The dependent child was only tangentially affected because the benefit was payable to the parent to prevent repossession and was not targeted at children.
5. The repayment-on-sale requirement had a rational connection with repayment. Sale realised the property’s value and equity, marked the end of the purpose served by support for the original home, and enabled the scheme to remain financially sustainable. Any remaining equity was still available to the recipient, while insufficient equity resulted in the loan or unpaid balance being written off.
6. The differential impact on disabled people was a matter of fact and degree. The possibility that some disabled recipients might be unable to move to more suitable accommodation did not make the bright-line rule manifestly disproportionate. A case-by-case portability scheme would be complex, resource-intensive and prone to challenge. Parliament and the Minister were entitled to prefer a simple rule and to give significant weight to fairness to taxpayers and scheme sustainability.
7. The Minister had complied with the public sector equality duty. The consultation, equality analysis, impact assessments and specific investigation of portability showed a conscious and conscientious consideration of disability-related disadvantages and possible mitigation. The duty did not require consideration of every possible subgroup or every factual consequence.

First-instance judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court. Both claims were dismissed by the High Court.