Preservation and Promotion of the Arts Ltd, R (On the Application Of) v Manchester Magistrates' Court

An application to state a case is validly made within the statutory time limit even if the prescribed fee has not yet been paid, unless the governing legislation makes payment a condition of validity. For charitable business-rates relief, the charity bears the burden of proving that the relevant use is wholly or mainly charitable and satisfies the public-benefit requirement. There is no presumption that artistic activity provides public benefit merely because it is described as art. Evidence may be required concerning the quality, accessibility and extent of the activity. “Wholly” does not mean “solely”: the court may consider the extent of actual use, but not whether the charity used space efficiently or needed all of it. Costs against a magistrates’ court require improper or obstructive conduct, not merely an error of law.

Two related proceedings concerned liability orders for unpaid business rates. In the Bolton case, PAPOA sought judicial review of a refusal by the Greater Manchester Magistrates’ Court to state a case after the District Judge considered the application out of time because the fee had been paid late. The substantive challenge was considered using the procedural shortcut described in Sunworld Ltd v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2001] 1 WLR 2102.

In the Birmingham case, PAPOA appealed by case stated against liability orders and a costs order made by the Birmingham Magistrates’ Court. The central issues were whether PAPOA had proved public benefit, whether the premises were wholly or mainly used for charitable purposes, and whether the costs order was lawful.

1. Bolton procedural issue. The application to state a case was validly made within 21 days. Sections 111 and 114 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, Part 35 of the Criminal Procedure Rules and the relevant fees legislation distinguish the making of the application from the later obligation to state or deliver the case. The fee was therefore not a condition of validity. The District Judge was wrong on this point and the matter would ordinarily have been remitted for a case to be stated.

2. Burden and public benefit. PAPOA bore the legal and evidential burden of proving entitlement to relief under sections 43(6) and 45A of the Local Government Finance Act 1988. That included proving that the purposes fell within sections 2 to 4 of the Charities Act 2011 and were for the public benefit. The description of an activity as artistic was insufficient. There was no presumption that a particular artistic activity satisfied the public-benefit requirement. The court could take judicial notice only where the matter was sufficiently obvious; otherwise evidence was required.

3. The reasoning in Westminster Bank Ltd v Pinion [1965] 1 Ch 85 showed that the court could consider the quality of exhibits, but should not rely merely on its own unsupported judgment. The District Judge was entitled to find the evidence insufficient and had not imposed an impermissible value judgment.

4. Extent of use. “Wholly” was not synonymous with “solely”. The statutory test permitted consideration of the extent of actual use and required substantial use in real terms for the public benefit. It did not permit the court to penalise inefficiency or ask whether the charity needed so much space. Advertising, accessibility and attendance could properly bear on whether the activity benefited the public or a sufficiently broad section of it.

5. Birmingham appeal. The District Judge’s conclusion that PAPOA had not proved qualifying use was an evaluation of the evidence and disclosed no error of law. His references to sparse use, the property portfolio, accounts, lack of registration, hearsay evidence and the absence of public access did not demonstrate that he had applied an erroneous test. The appeal therefore failed.

6. The District Judge was entitled to order PAPOA to pay Birmingham’s costs under section 64(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. No Civil Procedure Rules summary assessment procedure applied, and no specific defect in the schedule had been identified.

7. The application for costs against the Greater Manchester Magistrates’ Court was refused. The court had made an error of law, but its conduct was not improper, obstructive or flagrantly improper.

• Greater Manchester Magistrates’ Court: refused to state a case and made a liability order against PAPOA. The Administrative Court held that the refusal was legally wrong on the fee issue but rejected the substantive challenge.
• Birmingham Magistrates’ Court: made liability orders and ordered PAPOA to pay costs. The Administrative Court dismissed the appeal by case stated.