Goodland, R (On the Application Of) v Chief Constable Of Staffordshire Police

Under the Police (Injury Benefit) Regulations 2006, a police pension authority must periodically consider whether an injury pensioner’s degree of disablement has substantially altered and revise the pension accordingly. It cannot promise that reviews will never occur or guarantee payment at a level exceeding the statutory entitlement.

Regulation 33 permits the authority to determine the issue itself where an applicant or pensioner wilfully or negligently refuses requirements which the medical authority considers necessary for a reliable examination or interview. That may include access to relevant medical records. The statutory scheme, taken as a whole, provides an Article 6-compliant procedure. A refusal to consent to disclosure engages the choice and consequences provided by regulation 33; it does not ordinarily breach Article 8.

The claims concerned former Staffordshire police officers receiving injury pensions under the Police (Injury Benefit) Regulations 2006.

Mr Goodland challenged a proposed review of his pension, relying on a 2008 assurance that his pension was guaranteed for life and would not be reviewed unless he requested it. The other claimants challenged decisions under regulation 33 reducing their pensions after they refused to complete questionnaires and consent to access to medical records.

The central issues were whether the assurance created an enforceable legitimate expectation or an A1P1 possession, whether refusal of access to medical records engaged regulation 33, and whether the resulting decisions breached Articles 6 or 8 ECHR or the common law duty of fairness.

1. Goodland claim. The 2008 letter was clear and unambiguous, but it could not lawfully create an expectation that regulation 37 reviews would never occur or that payment would continue regardless of statutory entitlement. Regulation 37 imposed a continuing duty to monitor awards. The only legitimate expectation was payment in accordance with the Regulations. The common-law legitimate-expectation claim therefore failed.
2. The assurance did not constitute a possession protected by A1P1. It was not a contract, did not have a sufficient basis in domestic law, and did not alter the statutory extent of the pension right. In any event, a review carried out to establish the statutory entitlement would pursue a legitimate public interest and would be proportionate. No injunction could require payment contrary to the Regulations.
3. Wright claims. Regulation 33 was not triggered merely because the claimants failed to complete questionnaires. No SMP considered that completion was necessary to enable the medical decision. The Defendant could nevertheless take that general lack of cooperation into account when exercising his regulation 33 discretion.
4. Refusal to consent to access to relevant medical records could amount to failure to submit to a medical examination or attend an interview. The words of regulation 33 were deliberately broad. The medical authority was entitled to require information it considered necessary to make a reliable assessment, particularly where the assessment concerned changes in earning capacity over many years. The claimants’ blanket refusals frustrated that process.
5. The Regulations, taken as a whole, provided independent medical assessment, appeal to the Police Medical Appeal Board, and further appeal to the Crown Court or appeal tribunal. Article 6 was therefore satisfied overall, even though regulation 33 allowed the PPA to decide the matter after a wilful or negligent refusal to cooperate. Article 8 was not breached because consent remained voluntary, the consequences were explained, access was limited to the statutory task, and confidentiality and data-protection safeguards applied.
6. The claimants had been given adequate opportunities to provide evidence and make representations. Their refusal to use the available procedures did not make the PPA’s subsequent decisions unfair. Both sets of claims were dismissed.

First-instance judicial review claims. The judgment records no subsequent appellate decision.