Gumieniczeck v Polish Judicial Authority

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, passage of time bars extradition only where extradition would be unjust or oppressive. Unjustness concerns prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial. Oppression concerns hardship arising from changes in the requested person’s circumstances. Ordinary hardship caused by extradition is insufficient, and even a lengthy delay is not determinative. The court must assess the explanation for delay and balance all relevant circumstances, including the requested person’s ability to be located, family circumstances and the seriousness of the alleged offence. The absence of fugitive status does not itself establish oppression.

The applicant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a decision of Deputy Senior District Judge Ikram ordering his extradition to Poland for prosecution for a 2007 assault. The permission to appeal was limited to whether extradition was unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time under section 14. The applicant accepted that the unjustness limb was not made out and pursued oppression.

The District Judge had found that the delay was substantially explained because the applicant’s whereabouts had been uncertain, and had balanced the seriousness of the allegation, the applicant’s family circumstances and the competing factors for and against extradition. The central issue was whether that conclusion was one which the Judge ought to have reached differently.

1. Appeal dismissed. Under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003, the High Court could allow the appeal only if the District Judge ought to have decided the relevant question differently. The District Judge had reached the correct conclusion on oppression and on section 14 as a whole.
2. Section 14 distinguishes between unjustness and oppression. Unjustness concerns the risk of prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial. Oppression concerns hardship resulting from changes in the requested person’s circumstances. The applicant made no submissions on unjustness, so the appeal could not succeed on that limb.
3. The test for oppression is demanding. Ordinary hardship resulting from an extradition order is insufficient, as recognised in Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1038. The fact that the alleged offence occurred more than 11 years before the extradition hearing was a powerful factor against extradition, but was not determinative: Brzeksi v Regional Court in Gdansk, Poland [2012] EWHC 1138 (Admin).
4. The statutory concepts were applied in accordance with Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus and Ors [1978] 1 W.L.R. 779. There had been no unexplained or culpable delay. The applicant had lived in the United Kingdom and Italy, making apprehension difficult, and the fact that he was not a fugitive did not prevent extradition.
5. The District Judge had properly considered the applicant’s family circumstances, including the effect on his two young children, while also giving appropriate weight to the gravity of the alleged violent offence, the use of a weapon and the apparently serious injury. The suggestion that the Polish authorities had misled the court about the applicant’s whereabouts was rejected. The later issue concerning breach of bail was not before the court and would not have affected the decision.

• High Court (Administrative Court): the appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 was dismissed. The court held that the District Judge had correctly concluded that extradition was not barred by section 14.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: Deputy Senior District Judge Ikram ordered extradition to Poland on 19 September 2019.