Rashid v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police

For an arrest under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, suspicion requires both a genuine suspicion in the arresting officer’s mind and objectively reasonable grounds based on information then available to that officer.

The separate necessity requirement is more demanding. Officers must consider less intrusive alternatives, including voluntary attendance and requests for potential evidence. Where a suspect is expected to co-operate, arrest is unlawful if those alternatives are practicable and the statutory grounds for a personal search are not established.

The claimant, a GP, was arrested during an investigation into fraudulent motor-insurance claims. He was interviewed, released on bail and later informed that no charges would be brought. He claimed damages for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment and trespass.

The County Court at Bradford dismissed the claim. The claimant appealed, challenging the findings that the arresting officer honestly and reasonably suspected him of involvement in fraud and honestly and reasonably believed that arrest was necessary for a prompt and effective investigation. The appeal also raised issues concerning alternative lawful arrest, ex turpi causa, search warrants and the adequacy of the Recorder’s reasons.

Appeal allowed. The Recorder’s decision was quashed and replaced by a judgment that the claimant’s arrest was unlawful.

1. Reasonable suspicion. Under sections 24(2) and 24(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the arresting officer must genuinely suspect the person of guilt and must have objectively reasonable grounds for that suspicion. The grounds are assessed by reference to the information in the officer’s mind when the power is exercised. Applying O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] A.C. 286, the court held that the cumulative evidence concerning the claimant’s connections with Advance Claims, payments, examination practices, fees and reports provided reasonable grounds. The Recorder was entitled to accept the contemporary documents and DI Taylor’s evidence.
2. Necessity. Sections 24(4) and 24(5) imposed a distinct and higher hurdle. The officers genuinely believed that arrest was necessary, but the grounds for that belief were not objectively reasonable. There was no relevant time constraint on voluntary attendance. An interview could have been arranged for a later date. The court also rejected the submission that a voluntary interview could not be offered if arrest would follow upon an attempt to leave.
3. Search and mobile telephone evidence. A warrant for premises did not impliedly authorise a search of a person. If arrest was sought only to search for evidence under section 32(2)(a)(ii), section 32(5) required reasonable grounds for believing that the evidence was concealed on the person. The arrest had been planned before the officers attended. The claimant was expected to co-operate, his telephone was on his bedside table, and no telephone was found on his person. Following the approach illustrated by Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v MR [2019] EWHC 888, the officers should first have asked for the telephone. Arrest was not reasonably necessary in the circumstances.
4. Alternative issues and reasons. The Lumba/Parker issue could not produce a lawful alternative arrest. The claimant’s conduct merely provided the occasion for the arrest and did not cause the unlawful arrest, so ex turpi causa had no application. Although the Recorder gave no reasons for his alternative conclusions, his primary judgment, read as a whole, gave sufficient reasons.

1. County Court at Bradford: Mr Recorder Nolan QC dismissed the claimant’s claim on 20 September 2019. He found that the arresting officer had an honest and reasonable suspicion and an honest and reasonable belief that arrest was necessary.
2. High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): The appeal was allowed. The Recorder’s decision was quashed and judgment substituted that the arrest was unlawful.