Crocker v Devon And Cornwall Police

An appeal against a closure order is made in time only if written notice is given within 21 days both to the designated officer for the Magistrates’ Court and to the other party. The appeal need not be heard within that period. Rule 7(5) of the Crown Court Rules SI 1982 No 1109 applies to closure-order appeals under section 84(5) of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, giving the Crown Court power to extend time before or after expiry. In exercising that discretion, the court must consider the statutory purpose of providing a swift remedy for serious nuisance or disruptive behaviour.

The appellant challenged a three-month closure order made by Plymouth Magistrates’ Court under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Her solicitors sent the appeal notice to the Magistrates’ Court within 21 days, but served the police after the statutory period had expired.

The Crown Court dismissed the appeal as out of time, relying on Hampshire Police Authority v Smith [2009] EWHC 174 (Admin); [2010] 1 WLR 40. The stated questions were whether service on the other party had to occur within 21 days and whether rule 7(5) permitted an extension of time.

1. The appeal was allowed and remitted to Plymouth Crown Court. The Crown Court was required to consider whether to extend time and, if appropriate, whether the appeal should proceed.

2. Section 84(5) of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, read with rule 7(2) of the Crown Court Rules SI 1982 No 1109, required written notice within 21 days to both the designated officer for the Magistrates’ Court and the other party to the appeal. The statutory period governed commencement of the appeal, not the date on which the Crown Court had to hear it.

3. The wording of the 2014 Act did not show that Parliament had itself prescribed the procedural requirement of service or removed the court’s procedural discretion. The position therefore differed from the statutory regimes considered in Hampshire Police Authority v Smith [2009] EWHC 174 (Admin) and [2010] 1 WLR 40, and from the provisions considered in Mucelli v Albania [2009] UKHL 2 and [2009] 1 WLR 276.

4. Rule 7(5) applied because the power to extend time was an integral part of rule 7, which supplied the requirement to give notice to the other party. The Crown Court could extend time before or after expiry. It was unnecessary to construct a separate discretion under article 6 of the ECHR, although the reasoning in Pomiechowski v District Court of Legnica, Poland [2012] UKSC 20; [2012] 1 WLR 1604 explained why an interpretation excluding any extension would be problematic.

5. When exercising the discretion, the Crown Court had to consider, among other matters, the need not to frustrate the swift statutory purpose of closure orders. The expired closure order and possible possession proceedings justified remittal so that the Crown Court could determine whether the appeal remained materially relevant.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal by way of case stated, answered the stated questions in favour of the appellant, and remitted the matter to Plymouth Crown Court.
• Plymouth Crown Court: dismissed the appeal as out of time, holding that there was no power to extend time.