Weed, R (On the Application Of) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

Discretionary police sick pay is governed by an individualised assessment under the applicable regulations and force policy. A finding that an officer has suffered an injury in the execution of duty for pension purposes does not require the grant of discretionary sick pay. The pension test has a broader scope and is not the relevant test under the sick-pay policy. A decision-maker may rely on illustrative policy examples, provided the discretion remains open and the case is considered on its merits. A representation that a discretion cannot be exercised until a specified condition is met does not promise any particular outcome once that condition is satisfied. Judicial review does not permit the court to substitute its own assessment where the decision was reasonably open to the decision-maker.

The claimant, a Metropolitan Police officer, suffered psychiatric illness after events arising from his work as an officer in charge of a criminal prosecution. After exhausting his ordinary sick-pay entitlement, he sought discretionary sick pay.

The Metropolitan Police policy contained guidance on cases likely to attract favourable discretion, including medically diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from police duty, while distinguishing stress-related illness resulting from working conditions generally. The claimant was later found by the Police Medical Appeal Board to have sustained a permanent injury in the execution of duty for the purposes of the police injury-benefit scheme.

He challenged the refusal to reinstate discretionary sick pay, alleging irrationality, procedural unfairness, irrelevant considerations, inadequate reasons and breach of a legitimate expectation.

1. Claim dismissed. The refusal of discretionary sick pay was neither irrational nor unfair.
2. The statutory sick-pay scheme required an individualised discretionary assessment. The relevant determination authorised the chief officer to award additional pay for a specified period, but did not require favourable treatment whenever an officer had suffered an injury in the execution of duty. The PNB guidance likewise emphasised consideration of each case on its merits and prohibited a fixed policy.
3. The pension legislation and the sick-pay scheme pursued different purposes. The test for an injury award under the Police Pensions Regulations 1987 and the Police (Injury Benefit) Regulations 2006 had a broad meaning. It was not the test governing discretionary sick pay. The MPS SOP expressly stated that the pension test was not relevant and that its boundaries were more tightly drawn.
4. The decision-maker was entitled to apply the SOP and to treat the claimant’s condition as closer to stress-related illness resulting from working conditions generally than to medically diagnosed PTSD resulting from the performance of police duty. The claimant’s own inappropriate conduct could also be considered as part of the broad discretionary assessment. The court’s role was limited to public-law review and did not extend to substituting a different assessment.
5. The representation relied on by the claimant was, at most, a promise that a fresh decision would be made if the specified condition was satisfied and a review was otherwise open. It did not promise that sick pay would be granted. In any event, the PMAB had overturned the PTSD diagnosis which formed part of the foundation of the representation. No clear and unambiguous promise was established.
6. The claimant knew the SOP and had an opportunity to make representations. The decision gave sufficient reasons by identifying the policy applied, the relevant examples, the comparison between PTSD and stress-related illness, and the significance of the events leading to the illness.