Rees v Windsor-Clive & Ors

For Case B under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, land must be required for the permitted non-agricultural use when the notice expires or within a relatively short time. The landlord must also show a genuine intention to develop and a reasonable prospect of development. A general finding that the whole holding is presently required for preparatory and infrastructure works may suffice; parcel-by-parcel dates are not essential.

An arbitrator may correct an accidental slip under the Arbitration Act 1996 where the arbitrator overlooked wording in the notice. That power does not necessarily involve reconsideration of the original decision. Procedural irregularity requires substantial injustice.

The claimant, an agricultural tenant, challenged an arbitration award concerning three Case B notices to quit served by his landlords under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986. The notices related to land required for the Plasdŵr development and to a strip required for a cycleway.

The challenge raised two questions of law under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 and three alleged serious irregularities under section 68. The issues included the meaning of “is required” in Case B, whether a cycleway involved “building development”, whether the arbitrator could correct the first award, whether an unpleaded estoppel point could be considered, and whether further findings about timing were required.

1. Case B requirement. The phrase “is required” means that the land must be required for the relevant permitted use at the expiry of the notice or within a relatively short time thereafter. The landlord must also establish a genuine intention to develop and a reasonable prospect of doing so. These requirements were accepted as common ground and were consistent with Jones v Gates [1954] 1 WLR 222 and Paddock Investments Ltd v Lory [1975] 2 EGLR 5.
2. The arbitrator had expressly found a present requirement for the land, based on earth moving, storage and infrastructure works, together with a genuine intention and reasonable prospect of development. He was not required to identify the date on which each parcel would be needed. The first question of law therefore did not arise and there was no basis for remission.
3. “Building development” was construed in the factual context. The proposed cycleway involved construction of an embankment forming part of a highway and therefore amounted to road building, even where the embankment was shallow. The arbitrator was entitled to uphold the notice on that basis.
4. Under section 57(3)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1996, the arbitrator could correct the first award after overlooking and failing to consider wording concerning the extent of the land. That was an accidental slip, rather than an impermissible review of the decision.
5. The arbitrator’s consideration of the landlords’ estoppel case did not constitute a serious irregularity. The point arose in response to a new argument raised by the tenant, and the tenant had an opportunity to address the resulting legal issues. The remaining complaint about the timing of requirements likewise caused no serious irregularity.
6. The appeal was dismissed. The parties were to submit a draft order and written submissions on any consequential matter not agreed within 14 days.

The judgment records a challenge to an arbitration award dated 21 January 2020. The High Court dismissed the appeal and refused to remit the matter to the arbitrator.