IC v RC

The slip rule under FPR 29.16 may be used at any time to correct an accidental slip or omission in a judgment or order, including an order that has ceased to have effect. It cannot be used to correct a substantive error or to permit second thoughts. The controlling question is whether the order accurately records the court’s original intention.

In exercising the discretion, the court must apply the overriding objective and consider all the circumstances. The interests of justice in correcting an inaccurate order will ordinarily prevail, although reliance and prejudice remain relevant. An application may be made without notice, provided that the affected party has a proper opportunity to seek variation or discharge of the correction.

The husband sought permission to appeal, and an extension of time, against orders correcting a 2017 variation order under the slip rule. The original order had reduced periodical payments but accidentally stated that they would end on the husband’s remarriage, rather than the wife’s remarriage. The husband remarried and stopped paying, relying on the wording of the order.

The wife applied in 2019 for correction under FPR 29.16. The District Judge corrected the order without notice, then heard and rejected the husband’s objection. The issues were whether the slip rule applied to an order no longer extant, whether the correction was permissible, whether the without-notice procedure was irregular, and whether permission and an extension of time should be granted.

1. Appeal and permission. The husband’s appeal was dismissed. Permission would not have been granted because the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason to hear it. The application for an extension of time was also refused. The delay was substantial, there was no good reason for it, and the husband’s status as a litigant in person and late decision to obtain legal advice did not justify non-compliance.
2. Scope of the slip rule. FPR 29.16(1) permits the court to correct an accidental slip or omission in a judgment or order “at any time”. The rule contains no restriction to extant orders. It may therefore be used after an order has apparently terminated. The court had jurisdiction in 2019 because the District Judge had jurisdiction to make the original order in 2017.
3. Nature of the error. The correction was not a substantive alteration or an attempt to give the court second thoughts. The 2017 judgment showed that the District Judge had refused to discharge the husband’s maintenance liability and had not altered the existing trigger events. The erroneous wording resulted from an accidental drafting error. Correcting it made the order an accurate record of the court’s manifest intention.
4. Discretion and prejudice. The discretion had to be exercised consistently with the overriding objective in FPR 1.1(1). Accuracy in court orders is important because an inaccurate order may deprive a party of rights or remedies. The husband’s reliance on the defective wording was relevant, but he retained a remedy by applying to vary the periodical payments. The interests of justice in correcting the order outweighed the effect of delay and reliance, and the application should not be made unnecessarily complex.
5. Procedure. FPR 29.16(2) permits an application without notice. The District Judge properly gave the husband an opportunity to apply to set aside, vary or stay the correction and then heard his objections. No procedural prejudice was established.

The judgment concerned an appeal from orders made by District Judge Wright on 2 September 2019 and 14 October 2019. The appeal was dismissed, and the application for an extension of time to seek permission to appeal was refused.