Robinson v Barker & Anor

In a disputed road-traffic claim, liability is determined on the balance of probabilities by evaluating the evidence as a whole. The court may attach substantial weight to physical and expert evidence, particularly where witness recollections are unreliable or reconstructed. Expert evidence is not automatically decisive: the court remains entitled to prefer honest and reliable factual evidence where appropriate. A claimant must establish the alleged mechanism of the collision on the balance of probabilities. Where the competing accounts are both unreliable and the objective evidence materially favours one version, the court may dismiss the claim and enter judgment on a counterclaim.

The claimant, a self-employed taxi driver, suffered serious brain injuries when his vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by the first defendant. He alleged that the defendant emerged from a side road without giving way. The defendant alleged that the claimant, having stopped or slowed on the main road, began a U-turn into the defendant’s path.

The claimant brought a claim for damages. The first defendant counterclaimed for soft-tissue injuries and vehicle-hire charges. The insurer was joined solely because it insured the first defendant. The central issue was which account of the collision was more probable.

1. Outcome. The court found that the collision occurred substantially as alleged by the defendant. The claimant’s claim was dismissed and judgment was entered on the counterclaim, with the amount to be determined by the court.
2. The applicable standard was the balance of probabilities. The court had to assess the totality of the evidence, including the parties’ accounts, the eyewitness evidence, contemporaneous material, vehicle damage, fluid deposits, vehicle resting positions and accident-reconstruction evidence.
3. Neither party was a reliable witness. The claimant’s account was inconsistent with the evidence concerning vehicle speeds, trajectories and post-impact movement. The defendant was found to have lied about the presence of a passenger, but that collateral lie did not determine the central issue. His account was nevertheless supported by his consistent immediate account and by the physical evidence.
4. The eyewitness was honest but not reliably accurate about the precise collision mechanism. Her account that the defendant’s vehicle travelled directly from the side road at approximately 40 mph was inconsistent with the agreed reconstruction evidence and the turning geometry.
5. The experts’ evidence was not definitive and required judicial caution. However, taken as a whole, it provided powerful support for the defendant’s version. The court preferred and adopted the evidence of Dr Coley where it differed from that of Mr Hargreaves.
6. The court confirmed that it was not bound to prefer expert evidence over factual evidence merely because it was expert evidence, citing Armstrong & O’Connor v First York [2005] EWCA Civ 277. In this case, however, the objective evidence materially undermined the claimant’s account.

Not stated in the judgment.