Director of Public Prosecutions, R. (On the Applications of) v Crown Court At Woolwich

During the Covid-19 pandemic, delay caused by the lack of safe and suitable Crown Court capacity may constitute a good cause for extending a custody time limit under section 22(3) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. It is not automatically a sufficient cause. The court must examine the individual circumstances of the case and defendant, while preserving the statutory purposes of short periods in custody, prosecutorial diligence and judicial control.

The prosecution must address alternative venues, possible listing changes and the likely duration of delay. Extensions should generally be short and subject to review. A judge considering such an application must rely on evidence and submissions properly before the court. The pandemic did not, on the evidence, establish a systemic funding failure preventing extensions.

Two unrelated judicial review claims concerned extensions of custody time limits during the Covid-19 pandemic. In the first, the Director of Public Prosecutions challenged HH Judge Raynor’s refusal to extend Tesfa Young-Williams’s custody time limit in the Crown Court at Woolwich. In the second, Jayano Lucima challenged HH Judge Hillen’s decision to extend his custody time limit in the Central Criminal Court.

The central issues were whether pandemic-related limits on safe jury-trial capacity could amount to good and sufficient cause under section 22(3) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, and how the statutory discretion should be exercised.

1. Young-Williams. The court granted permission, granted judicial review and declared that Judge Raynor’s conclusion that the prosecution had not shown good and sufficient cause was not open to him. The lack of suitable courtrooms caused by the Covid-19 emergency was capable of constituting good cause under section 22(3)(iii) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.
2. Good cause and sufficient cause are distinct. Whether the cause is sufficient depends on the individual facts of the case and defendant. The statutory purposes identified in R v Manchester Crown Court, ex parte McDonald [1999] 1 WLR 841 remain applicable: custody should be as short as reasonably practicable, the prosecution must act diligently and expeditiously, and the court must control extensions.
3. The pandemic was materially different from localised listing difficulties. The evidence showed practical and logistical obstacles, continuing efforts to increase jury-trial capacity and additional funding. It did not establish systemic failure or a financial constraint of the type considered in R (McAuley) v Crown Court at Coventry [2012] 1 WLR 2766.
4. Relevant considerations include the likely delay, previous extensions, the defendant’s age and antecedents, likely sentence, reasons for refusing bail and particular vulnerabilities. In multi-handed trials, separate trials may reduce delay. The prosecution bears the burden, but no formal evidence about the general pandemic impact is ordinarily required. Extensions should generally not exceed about three months.
5. Judge Raynor’s decision was also procedurally unsatisfactory because he relied on matters not supported by evidence or addressed in submissions. His interpretation of article 6 of the Convention, including a supposed cost-related benchmark derived from Zimmermann v Switzerland (1983) 6 EHRR 17, was unsupported.
6. Lucima. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused. Judge Hillen had considered the relevant circumstances, correctly applied the governing principles and was entitled to find good and sufficient cause. Although greater weight might have been given to the claimant’s youth and the likely sentence, the decision was not unlawful.

The judgment determined two rolled-up judicial review claims against decisions of Crown Court judges. No prior appellate decision is stated.