Social Work England v Micu

An interim suspension order may be continued where continuation is necessary for public protection or otherwise in the public interest. The court must balance those considerations against the respondent’s interests, including prejudice caused by delay. Relevant factors include the gravity of the allegations, the evidence, the seriousness of the risk of harm, the reasons for delay and the respondent’s prejudice. The court must not determine the merits of the underlying allegations. An extension must be necessary and proportionate in duration, and the court may limit it to ensure focused and expeditious progress of the underlying proceedings.

Social Work England applied under paragraph 14(2) of Schedule 2 to the Social Workers Regulations 2018 for a further 10-month extension of an interim suspension order originally imposed by the Health and Care Professions Council. The respondent did not attend or appear through a representative, but communicated his opposition to the proposed duration and did not accept wrongdoing.

The application arose amid serious historic allegations, delay in the regulatory process, updated information from the Disclosure and Barring Service, and an imminent review by an interim order panel. The central issues were whether any extension was necessary and, if so, what duration was justified and proportionate.

1. Application granted in part. The interim suspension order was extended for six months, until 4pm on 29 May 2021. An extension of 10 months was refused as unjustified and disproportionate.
2. The governing test was whether continuation was necessary for the protection of members of the public or otherwise in the public interest. The court also had regard to the respondent’s interests. Relevant considerations included the gravity of the allegations, the nature of the evidence, the seriousness of the risk of harm, the reasons why the underlying case remained unresolved, and the prejudice caused to the respondent by continuation.
3. The court was not deciding whether the allegations had merit. Their substantiation remained a matter for the underlying proceedings. A clear conclusion that the underlying case had little merit could be taken into account, following General Medical Council v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369; [2007] 1 WLR 2007, but that circumstance was not established here.
4. The allegations were sufficiently serious, and the material before the court sufficiently supported interim public protection, to justify continuation. However, the respondent was suffering ongoing prejudice from the passage of time. The court therefore signalled the need for focus, discipline and expedition and declined to grant any extension beyond six months.
5. The forthcoming panel hearing had to assess independently whether continuation remained necessary in light of the updated circumstances. The court gave no indication as to how that panel should determine the risk assessment, consistent with the role of the adjudicators described by reference to Martinez v General Dental Council [2015] EWHC 1223 (Admin).
6. The respondent was given liberty to apply to vary or discharge the order on 48 hours’ notice. There was no order as to costs.

First-instance Administrative Court decision. The judgment states that the interim suspension order had originally been imposed by the Health and Care Professions Council and transferred to Social Work England, but records no prior court judgment.