Knipe v British Racing Drivers' Motor Sport Charity & Ors

Summary judgment may determine a short point of legal or documentary construction where the court has the evidence necessary for proper determination and the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it. In construing a will, the court identifies the testator’s intention from the words used in their documentary and factual context. Where a charitable gift names no existing institution, the gift may instead be construed as a gift for the relevant charitable purpose, particularly where the purpose is ascertainable and a general charitable intent appears. A direction permitting distribution before related family-provision proceedings is discretionary and may protect the personal representative without affecting the claimant’s substantive rights.

The claimant, executor and trustee of the estate of Barrie Russell Williams, applied on paper for summary judgment under CPR Part 24 in an uncontested CPR Part 8 claim. The claim sought construction of two residuary gifts in the deceased’s will, one referring to the British Racing Drivers’ Club Benevolent Fund and the other to the Cancer Research Fund. It also sought permission to distribute a property legacy before the sixth defendant’s claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 was resolved. The central issues were whether the gifts identified existing institutions or charitable purposes, and whether early distribution was appropriate.

1. Summary judgment. The court may decide a short point of law or construction summarily where it has all evidence necessary for proper determination and the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it. The court must not conduct a mini-trial. The will-construction issues and the requested payment direction could properly be determined without a hearing.
2. Construction of the benevolent-fund gift. The reference to the British Racing Drivers’ Club Benevolent Fund was construed as referring to the first defendant. The deceased’s professional background, club membership, familiarity with its affairs and the absence of any other candidate made that the intended beneficiary.
3. Construction of the cancer-research gift. Under section 21 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, extrinsic evidence could be admitted because “Cancer Research Fund” was ambiguous on its face. The evidence showed no particular institution was intended. The phrase therefore referred to the general charitable purpose of cancer research. Even if an institution had been intended, its identity was not critical and the will disclosed a general charitable intent, so the gift would not fail.
4. Early distribution. The executor was permitted to distribute the proceeds of the deceased’s property interest under clause 3 before resolution of the sixth defendant’s claim. The evidence made it highly unlikely that that claim would consume those proceeds, and the direction merely protected the executor against devastavit or breach of trust. It did not remove the sixth defendant’s rights against other persons.
5. Costs and liberty to apply. The claimant’s costs were payable from the estate, with assessment governed by CPR rule 46.3 and Practice Direction 46. Any defendant was given seven days after service of the order to apply to vary or set it aside.