IO v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

A dispersal decision under the asylum-support scheme may be irrational where the decision-maker fails to consider the applicant’s individual circumstances, medical evidence and the Secretary of State’s relevant policy. The “no choice” basis of accommodation does not remove the need for a reasoned assessment of exceptional circumstances. Where the policy requires consideration of treatment continuity, support networks, deferred dispersal, handover arrangements and reasonable travelling distance, those matters must be addressed. The decision-maker must also explain the reasons for proceeding with dispersal, particularly where the move may affect mental health and access to care. An unexplained departure from the policy, or application of criteria such as medical necessity or imperative need which do not appear in the policy, may render the decision irrational.

The claimant, an Afghan national and failed asylum seeker, received accommodation under section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 in Bristol for nearly three years. He had post-traumatic stress disorder, was receiving primary and secondary mental-health care, and relied on Bristol-based support networks.

The Secretary of State decided to move him to accommodation in Gloucester at short notice because the Bristol property was to be returned to its landlord. The claimant challenged the decision, alleging irrationality, failure to consider relevant evidence and policy requirements, inadequate reasons, and breach of applicable legal and policy duties. The central issue was whether the decision to proceed with dispersal had been reached rationally and in accordance with the Secretary of State’s dispersal policy.

1. Claim succeeded. The decision to proceed with dispersal was irrational and was required to be quashed. Each of the five identified reasons was sufficient independently.
2. The decision-maker was required to consider the claimant’s individual circumstances, medical evidence, support network and the Secretary of State’s detailed Healthcare Needs and Pregnancy Dispersal Policy. The policy required consideration of the nature and continuity of treatment, whether treatment could be transferred, whether interruption would affect its effectiveness, and whether the claimant’s support network would be interrupted.
3. The policy also required consideration of deferred or selective dispersal where a medical condition was notified and confirmed, including severe mental-health problems, difficulty replicating treatment, and an active support network. The claimant’s evidence engaged those matters, but there was no evidence that they had been considered.
4. The decision-maker had to determine whether treatment and support could be obtained in Gloucester or whether the claimant would need to travel to Bristol. If travel was required, reasonable travelling distance had to be assessed in light of his mental health, need for support and the practical and financial consequences. If treatment was to be transferred, the need for a handover of care and possible temporary accommodation or delayed dispersal also required consideration.
5. The absence of reasons was material. The claimant could not know whether the decision rested on access to treatment in Gloucester, travel to Bristol, or some combination. In the circumstances, the court was entitled to infer from the lack of explanation and evidence that the decision-maker had failed to consider the relevant matters properly.
6. The apparent use of “imperative” or “medically essential” as the threshold for remaining in Bristol was irrational and arbitrary because neither concept appeared in the policy. The “no choice” principle did not justify proceeding without a detailed reasoned assessment. The claim succeeded, and the parties were left to consider the terms of the appropriate order.