HM Solicitor General v Ellis

A breach of a general civil restraint order is appropriately analysed as civil contempt where no sufficient authority establishes that it should be treated as criminal contempt. The applicant must prove the alleged breach to the criminal standard. The respondent must have been aware of the order and must have acted in breach of its terms. An order restraining a person from procuring proceedings is strictly construed in favour of the alleged contemnor. “Procure” requires proof that the respondent persuaded or caused the relevant person to issue the claim or application; mere assistance is insufficient. Intention to pervert the course of justice is not an element of civil contempt, although intention may be relevant to sanction.

The Solicitor General applied for the committal of the respondent for nine alleged breaches of a general civil restraint order imposed in 2018 and extended in 2020. The order restrained him from issuing or procuring others to issue claims or applications in the High Court or County Court without permission.

The respondent had previously been found in contempt and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment suspended for one year. He accepted drafting the documents relied upon but denied procuring the named individuals to issue them. The central issues were whether he knew of the order, whether he had procured the relevant claims and applications, and whether the proceedings should be treated as civil or criminal contempt.

1. The alleged breaches were properly analysed as civil contempt. Although breach of a civil restraint order might arguably interfere with the administration of justice, no authority established that such breaches should be treated as criminal contempt.

2. The applicant nevertheless had to prove each allegation to the criminal standard. The respondent’s intention to pervert the course of justice was not an element of civil contempt, although his intent could be relevant when determining sanction.

3. The general civil restraint order had to be strictly applied and construed in favour of the alleged contemnor. “Procure” meant to persuade or cause another person to act, or to produce the relevant act by endeavour. Mere assistance to a person pursuing that person’s own case would not suffice.

4. The respondent was aware of the order. He had been present when it was made and had appealed against it. The court was sure that he procured all nine claims, applications and appeals. He had drafted the documents, managed a wider process directed at obtaining alleged proof of judicial corruption, manipulated vulnerable people, and used their proceedings for his own purposes rather than to address their underlying cases.

5. All nine breaches were proved and contempt was made out. The question of penalty was adjourned pending the respondent’s application for permission to appeal against the order permitting the committal proceedings. The respondent was reminded that the restraint order remained in force.

Not an appeal. The application followed an earlier contempt decision imposing the general civil restraint order and a subsequent permission order by Goose J. The judgment states that the restraint order had been upheld by the Court of Appeal, but gives no citation for that decision.