Strategic Technologies Pte Ltd v Procurement Bureau of the Republic of China Ministry of National Defence

A foreign judgment on a foreign judgment may be registered under the Administration of Justice Act 1920 where the statutory definition of “judgment” is satisfied. The Act contains no exclusion for judgment-on-judgment proceedings. Registration remains subject to the statutory jurisdiction, service, limitation, delay, justice and convenience requirements.

For service of an English registration order abroad, CPR 6.40 requires a method permitted for serving originating process in the foreign country. Mere knowledge of the order does not replace formal service where service initiates a fresh enforcement process. A party’s submission to a foreign jurisdiction is assessed objectively and in the round; a full contest on the substantive merits is unnecessary.

Article 53 of the Judgments Regulation does not apply to enforcement of judgments originating in non-member states, even where they have been registered in England.

Strategic Technologies Pte Ltd sought to enforce in England a Cayman default judgment obtained on a Singapore judgment arising from a contractual dispute concerning equipment supplied in Taiwan. The Cayman judgment had been registered in England under Part II of the Administration of Justice Act 1920.

The Ministry of National Defence applied to set aside registration, alleging invalid service, limitation, lack of jurisdiction, delay, non-disclosure and lack of justice or convenience. It also challenged an Article 53 certificate under the Judgments Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 and a writ of control.

The central issues were whether registration was valid, whether the MND had submitted to the Singapore jurisdiction, and whether the English and European enforcement steps could stand.

1. Service. Service of the registration order by registered post in Taiwan was invalid. Under CPR 74.6 and CPR 6.40, service had to use a method permitted for originating local process. Taiwanese law required use of official court or diplomatic channels. Actual knowledge did not cure the defect because service initiated a fresh enforcement process and triggered the period for applying to set aside registration.
2. Retrospective validation. There was no good reason to validate service retrospectively under CPR 6.15. ST could have used official channels, and the MND had promptly rejected the attempted service. Enforcement steps based on the unserved registration order were therefore premature.
3. Limitation and statutory scope. The 2014 Consent Order was a written and signed acknowledgment of liability for the Cayman judgment. It therefore postponed accrual for limitation purposes under sections 29 and 30 of the Limitation Act 1980, so registration was not barred by section 24. Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1920 used sufficiently broad language to include a judgment on a foreign judgment. The absence of an express exclusion, unlike the amended 1933 Act regime, meant that the AJA applied.
4. Submission and jurisdiction. Cayman law required an objective assessment of all the circumstances. A full contest on the merits was not a precondition to submission. The MND had entered an unqualified appearance, failed to challenge jurisdiction in time, sought a stay pending arbitration and other substantive relief, filed evidence addressing the merits, and later participated in Cayman enforcement proceedings. Taken together, those matters established submission to the Singapore jurisdiction.
5. Delay and discretion. Although registration occurred outside the twelve-month period in section 9(1), the delay was justified by the complex international enforcement history. The 2014 acknowledgment, absence of tangible prejudice and the MND’s failure to pursue available opportunities to contest liability made registration just and convenient. Registration was not set aside for non-disclosure or abuse of process.
6. Article 53. Following Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco Case C-129/92; [1994] QB 509, the Judgments Regulation did not apply to enforcement of a judgment originating in a non-member state. Registration in England did not transform the foreign judgment into a judgment given by an EU Member State court. The Article 53 Order was set aside as premature and, independently, certification was impermissible.
7. Outcome. The application to set aside the Second English Registered Judgment and the application for a general stay were dismissed. The Article 53 Order and writ of control were set aside as premature. ST’s application for retrospective validation of service was dismissed.