Gawryluk v

Where an application for permission to appeal in extradition proceedings is made out of time and the High Court refuses to consider it for that reason, there is no right to renew the application orally. The court must assess the whole period from the start of the permitted period, not merely the net delay after its expiry. Delay attributable to a legal representative is attributable to the applicant. A short-form appeal notice may be used, but the grounds must then be properly perfected within the period contemplated by the Criminal Procedure Rules. Failure to do so may justify refusal of any extension. The court may reopen an appeal only in truly exceptional circumstances.

The applicant sought to renew an application for permission to appeal against an extradition order made by the District Courts of Lomza and Bialystok. The appeal notice was required to be lodged within seven days under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003, but was lodged approximately ninety-six minutes late. Sir Ross Cranston refused to consider it. The applicant argued that he had a right to renew orally, that the delay should be assessed by reference only to the period after expiry of the seven days, and that the delay was attributable to his solicitor’s urgent travel to Poland.

The central issues were whether renewal was available, whether Szegfu v Hungary applied, and whether any extension should nevertheless be granted.

1. The application was dismissed. Criminal Procedure Rule 50.22 expressly excludes the right to renew where an out-of-time application for permission to appeal has been refused because it was out of time. Rule 50.17 did not alter that result because it addressed the general position and not the specific case governed by rule 50.22.

2. Rule 50.27 could not be used to circumvent the absence of a renewal right. There was no appeal before the court, and the exceptional circumstances required to reopen an appeal, identified through the Taylor v Lawrence jurisdiction and R (Wingfield) v Canterbury City Council and another [2020] EWCA Civ 1588, were absent.

3. Alternatively, the court considered the merits of the delay issue. The relevant period was the whole seven-day permitted period together with the subsequent delay. Looking only at the period after expiry would be an error of law. The applicant had not explained why the appeal had been left until the final day. Under Szegfu v Hungary [2015] EWHC 1764 (Admin), delay caused by the applicant’s legal adviser was attributable to the applicant.

4. The court accepted that short-form grounds can be appropriate in extradition cases, but the applicant could not rely indefinitely on perfunctory grounds. Criminal Procedure Rule 50.20(5) contemplated amendment within ten business days. The perfected grounds were supplied almost three months late, without adequate explanation, and no extension was justified.

5. Even assuming both a right of renewal and that Szegfu did not apply, a holistic assessment of the delays required refusal. The need for flexibility did not permit an applicant to lodge an inadequate notice merely to meet the initial time limit and then leave the appeal undeveloped for months.

The judgment does not state a prior appellate decision in the same proceedings. The application concerned renewal of permission to appeal after Sir Ross Cranston, sitting as a High Court Judge, refused to consider the out-of-time appeal notice.