Taylor v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council (Rev 2)

A closure order may be made without proving that the respondent personally engaged in disorderly, offensive or criminal behaviour. The statutory question is whether a person engaged, or was likely to engage, in such conduct on the premises, and whether the order was necessary to prevent its continuation, recurrence or occurrence. Hearsay is admissible in closure-order proceedings, but its weight must be assessed carefully. A respondent retains the privilege against self-incrimination and may remain silent. Proportionality requires careful consideration of the order’s duration and of whether the respondent should be excluded from the home. It does not generally require magistrates to investigate every alternative statutory, civil or criminal remedy. An appeal by case stated is confined to errors of law, excess of jurisdiction and equivalent public-law errors.

The appellant appealed by case stated under section 111 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 against a closure order made by Birmingham and Solihull magistrates under section 80(5) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

The order closed the appellant’s flat for three months and excluded him from it. The magistrates relied on drugs and associated items found during a search, evidence of visits by persons involved in drug dealing, and hearsay evidence concerning activity at the premises. The appeal raised admissibility and fairness, sufficiency of evidence, the statutory requirement for continuing conduct, and the proportionality of excluding the appellant from his home.

1. Appeal dismissed. The magistrates had made no error of law in admitting the evidence or in making the closure order.
2. Section 80(5) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 does not require proof that the respondent personally engaged in the relevant conduct. It is sufficient that a person engaged, or was likely to engage, in disorderly, offensive or criminal behaviour on the premises, or that the use of the premises caused or was likely to cause serious nuisance or disorder.
3. The proceedings were civil proceedings for the purposes of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. Hearsay was therefore admissible, but the magistrates had to consider carefully what weight, if any, it deserved. The court could not conclude that the magistrates had erred in attaching significant weight to anonymous statements without seeing the statements or transcripts.
4. The bare facts of the arrest, search and criminal investigation had no probative value in themselves. The products of the search were materially relevant because they provided direct evidence that the flat had been used for drug-related purposes. The appellant retained the privilege against self-incrimination and could have declined to answer questions tending to incriminate him.
5. An appeal under section 111 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 is not a rehearing on the facts. The appellant had not shown that the magistrates’ findings were irrational, perverse, inadequate or incoherent.
6. Proportionality required careful consideration of the order’s duration and whether the appellant should be prohibited from accessing his home. It did not require the magistrates, of their own motion, to analyse every possible injunction, prosecution or local-authority power. The magistrates had considered the three-month duration and the appellant’s exclusion, and no error of law or logic was shown.
7. The order was therefore necessary and proportionate, notwithstanding its interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): appeal by case stated dismissed. The closure order made by the Birmingham and Solihull magistrates was upheld.