Jasvins v General Prosecutor's Office Latvia

Successive extradition proceedings may constitute an abuse of process where they amount to a collateral attack on a decision made in materially identical earlier proceedings. The court must make a broad, merits-based assessment of all public and private interests. There is no automatic bar to a later request.

Where the requesting authority seeks to rely on evidence excluded from earlier proceedings because of an unjustified failure to comply with a court order, the court must weigh the public interest in extradition against procedural integrity, finality, the gravity of the offending and prejudice to the requested person. The abuse jurisdiction is a defence of last resort and must protect, rather than subvert, the statutory extradition scheme.

The appellant challenged an order for his extradition to Latvia under a second European Arrest Warrant. The warrant sought his return to serve a five-year sentence following the revocation of a suspended sentence for a cannabis offence.

Proceedings under a materially identical earlier warrant had ended when Dingemans J allowed an appeal and discharged the extradition order. The requesting authority had failed to comply with an order requiring evidence addressing an allegation that the prosecution had been brought in retaliation for a complaint of police brutality. Dingemans J refused a late adjournment and held that reasonable grounds for believing the alleged abuse might have occurred had not been rebutted.

In the second proceedings, District Judge Baraitser admitted new material addressing that allegation and ordered extradition. The central issue was whether pursuit of the second warrant, relying on material excluded from the earlier proceedings, constituted an abuse of process. The appellant also renewed claims under section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 based on articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.

1. The appeal was allowed. The extradition order was quashed and the appellant was discharged.

2. The rule concerning finality of litigation applies in extradition proceedings, but not mechanically. Successive warrants do not necessarily constitute an abuse. The court must make the broad, merits-based assessment required by Giese v Government of the United States of America [2018] 4 WLR 103. It must consider all the facts and balance the public and private interests involved. There is no doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel in extradition proceedings.

3. Proceedings under a later warrant are capable of constituting an abuse, and ordinarily may do so, where they amount to a collateral attack on a decision made in proceedings under a materially identical earlier warrant. The result nevertheless depends on the circumstances. The abuse jurisdiction is a defence of last resort and must not subvert the statutory bars in the Extradition Act 2003.

4. The integrity of the European Arrest Warrant system includes both the return of offenders and effective judicial case management. Court orders should ordinarily be obeyed. Where abuse is alleged because of non-compliance in earlier proceedings, the later court must assess the significance of allowing the requesting authority to escape the consequences of the earlier ruling. It must also consider the public interest in the particular extradition, the gravity of the offending and any prejudice to the requested person.

5. The second proceedings were, in substance, an attempt to circumvent Dingemans J's refusal to adjourn the earlier appeal. The new documents were precisely the evidence which should have been filed under Collins J's order. The District Judge should have admitted them only if the requesting authority justified reliance on them despite its earlier default. No sufficient justification had been provided. The unexplained delay in certifying the second warrant, the limited gravity and age of the cannabis offence, and the resulting unfair prejudice reinforced the conclusion that the proceedings were abusive. In these circumstances, the public interest in extradition yielded to the interests in compliance with court orders and finality.

6. Obiter, the renewed Convention grounds were unarguable. An alleged police assault in 2010 did not establish a real risk of article 3 ill-treatment upon return. Extradition would interfere with private life under article 8, but that interference was justified by the public interest in effective extradition arrangements.

• High Court (Divisional Court): Allowed the appeal, quashed the extradition order and discharged the appellant. The renewed application concerning articles 3 and 8 was rejected as unarguable.

• High Court: Julian Knowles J refused permission to appeal on the section 21 Convention grounds.

• Westminster Magistrates' Court: District Judge Baraitser ordered extradition on 8 May 2019 under the second European Arrest Warrant. She rejected abuse of process and claims under section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003.

• Earlier warrant proceedings: Dingemans J had allowed an appeal concerning the materially identical first warrant and discharged the earlier extradition order after the requesting authority failed to rebut reasonable grounds for believing that an abuse might have occurred.