Anwer v Central Bridging Loans Ltd

Permission to commence private committal proceedings requires a strong prima facie case against each alleged contemnor. The applicant must show, in relation to each statement relied upon, a case that it was knowingly or recklessly false and likely to interfere with the administration of justice. A case based on unanswered questions, speculation or disagreement with evaluative opinions is insufficient. A non-verbatim attendance note is not necessarily inaccurate merely because it omits part of a judge’s reasoning. Statements in witness evidence expressing an honestly held assessment of the merits are not knowingly false statements of fact merely because a court might later take a different view. Where the strong prima facie threshold is not met, the court need not consider the remaining permission factors.

Mr Anwer applied for permission to commence committal proceedings against directors of Central Bridging Loans Ltd and two solicitors. He alleged that an attendance note and witness statements contained knowingly false or misleading statements concerning an earlier injunction hearing, and sought to add unidentified funders as alleged shadow directors.

The application arose in the context of possession, debt and bankruptcy-related proceedings. The court also gave directions concerning the respondent’s separate application for an extended civil restraint order. The central issue was whether Mr Anwer had established the threshold case required before private contempt proceedings could proceed.

1. Permission refused. The application failed because Mr Anwer had not established a strong prima facie case against any alleged contemnor. The proposed amendment to add the funders was also refused.
2. The governing principles were those identified by the Court of Appeal in Tinkler v Elliott [2014] EWCA Civ 564. For the alleged contempt, the applicant had to show a strong prima facie case that each statement was false, that the maker knew it was false, and that the maker knew it was likely to interfere with the course of justice. The court also had to consider public interest, proportionality and the overriding objective, but it was unnecessary to reach those matters once the first threshold failed.
3. The attendance note was not shown to be false. It recorded the substance of the hearing and conveyed that the injunction had not reached the level required for its grant. The omission of the judge’s comment that the application was not frivolous did not make the note inaccurate. It was also unclear whether that comment represented a considered conclusion that there was a serious issue to be tried, since the injunction was refused because damages were an adequate remedy.
4. The application to set aside the statutory demands required a fresh assessment on different evidence. Any view formed at the earlier injunction hearing would have had little, if any, relevance to whether the debt was disputed in good faith and on substantial grounds.
5. The statements that there was no substantive cause of action or defence and that the injunction application was totally without merit were evaluative opinions. They were not knowingly false statements of fact merely because a later court might disagree with them.
6. The statement that the transcript had now been seen was not objectively misleading in context, and the suggestion that it was intended to deceive was groundless. The application for an extended civil restraint order was retained for directions. Mr Anwer was allowed six weeks to provide evidence, and costs relating to that application were costs in the application.