Lakatamia Shipping Company Ltd & Ors v Su & Ors

The court may, under section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and its inherent jurisdiction, make proportionate orders designed to secure compliance with existing disclosure and enforcement orders. In an appropriate post-judgment case, this may include appointing an independent lawyer to obtain and review access to communications which the defendant is obliged to disclose but refuses to produce. The court adopted the stringent search-order requirements of an extremely strong prima facie case, serious damage, clear evidence of relevant documents and a real risk of destruction, and proportionality. However, section 37(1) did not authorise a coercive electronically monitored curfew where the order was not a condition of relief sought by the defendant and no alternative order was available.

The judgment concerned further applications arising from the claimants’ long-running attempts to enforce judgments against the first defendant. The applications sought continuation of an injunction requiring access to email and social-media accounts, mandates requiring account providers to release access information, and additional conditions on the defendant’s release from prison, including residence at a specified address and electronic monitoring.

The court had previously granted related orders and adjourned the injunction’s return date. The central issues were whether the court had jurisdiction to compel compliance through an independent lawyer or signed mandates, what test should govern that relief, and whether section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 authorised an electronically monitored curfew.

1. Injunction and disclosure. The court had jurisdiction under section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and its inherent jurisdiction to make an order securing compliance with existing disclosure and document-production obligations. The order could require an independent lawyer to obtain access to the defendant’s email and social-media accounts and provide non-privileged material to the claimants.
2. Although the application was post-judgment, the court applied the more stringent search-order test. The claimants had an extremely strong prima facie case, serious existing and potential damage, clear evidence that the defendant possessed relevant documents and that there was a real risk of destruction or concealment, and a proportionate remedy. The order was justified by the defendant’s repeated non-compliance and the absence of a realistic alternative.
3. Privacy safeguards were required. The independent lawyer was not to provide documents obviously irrelevant to identifying assets, assessed by the wider train-of-enquiry test. The claimants could use the documents only to enforce the judgments, absent permission of the court. The injunction was continued.
4. The court also had jurisdiction under section 37(1) to require the defendant to sign mandates directed to his email and social-media providers. The mandates were granted, but no resulting documents were to be handed to the claimants before the return date.
5. Electronic monitoring. The court accepted that the defendant represented a significant flight risk. However, section 37(1) did not authorise an electronically monitored curfew effectively confining him to his home for 22 hours a day. The penal character of such an order and the requirement for clear legislative authority meant that the application failed. The court instead ordered disclosure of the post-release address and issued a Ports Alert.