South Derbyshire District Council v Secretary of State for Housing Communities and Local Government

For a planning statutory review, the statutory time limit applies to making the application to the court, which occurs when the claim form is filed. Service is a separate procedural step governed by the rules and practice directions, so the court may extend time for service where the circumstances justify it. In deciding whether to extend time, the court considers the mandatory nature of the service provision, the need for certainty and finality, the parties’ conduct, prejudice and the overriding objective.

Planning policies must be interpreted as part of the development plan read as a whole. Authorities concerning one local plan cannot simply be transplanted into another, because local policies are area-specific.

South Derbyshire District Council challenged a Planning Inspector’s decision granting permission for three dwellings outside the settlement boundary. The claim form and application for permission were filed within the six-week period under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, but service reached the Defendant one day late because the Government Legal Department’s service address had changed.

The court first determined whether it had jurisdiction, then considered an extension of time for service and whether permission should be granted. The substantive issue was the interpretation of policy H1 of the South Derbyshire Local Plan Part 1, including its relationship with policy HP21 and the plan glossary.

1. Jurisdiction. The application for planning statutory review was made in time when the Part 8 claim form, including the request for permission, was filed with the Administrative Court on 15 November 2019. Section 288(4B) fixes the period for making the application, while service is dealt with separately by PD8C. The reasoning in Summers v Minister of Health and Mendip District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment remained applicable. Croke v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government concerned extension of the statutory period for making the application and did not displace that distinction.
2. Service. Service was one day late. The court extended time under the procedural rules. Relevant considerations included the mandatory wording of the service provision, the importance of certainty and finality, the solicitors’ reasonable reliance on the outdated hard-copy White Book, the absence of prejudice, the minimal delay and the overriding objective. The Interested Party had raised no objection.
3. Permission. The interpretation of planning policy is a question of law, although its application is ordinarily a matter of planning judgment. The court may intervene where the decision-maker has made a legally material error, including a Wednesbury error. The development plan must be read as a whole, and the decision-maker must identify and understand the relevant policies and determine whether the proposal accords with the plan.
4. The court accepted that the Inspector may have treated policy H1 and related provisions in isolation and thereby misinterpreted the development plan. The principles in Gladman Developments Ltd v Canterbury City Council were relevant as a summary of the general approach, but the court cautioned, following Chichester DC v Secretary of State for Housing Communities and Local Government, against transferring policy analysis from one local plan to another.
5. Permission to bring the statutory review claim was granted on both grounds. The question of the final order was adjourned for consequential submissions.

First-instance decision of the High Court (Administrative Court). The judgment does not state an earlier decision in the same litigation.