Green & Ors v Hurst

Permission to bring committal proceedings for false statements should be granted only with great caution. The applicant must show a strong prima facie case that the statements were knowingly false, or made recklessly as to their truth. The court must also be satisfied that proceedings are in the public interest, proportionate and consistent with the overriding objective.

Materiality, the use made of the statements, delay, the strength of the evidence, likely costs and court time are relevant. The contempt jurisdiction cannot be used by a private litigant to obtain a declaration supporting a collateral attack on an earlier judgment or bankruptcy order.

The defendant sought permission to bring committal proceedings against the three claimants under CPR rule 81.18(1)(a). He alleged that witness statements filed in earlier proceedings contained knowingly false evidence about legal advice given to his mother before a trust transaction.

The allegations relied principally on a conversation with one claimant in 2018 and correspondence from the Solicitors Regulation Authority. Earlier applications to annul the defendant’s bankruptcy order, based on substantially the same allegations, had failed. The central issues were whether there was a strong prima facie case and whether committal proceedings would be in the public interest and proportionate.

1. The application was treated as an application for permission under CPR rule 81.18(1)(a). Permission was refused.

2. Under CPR r 32.14, contempt may arise where a person makes a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth. The permission stage requires a strong prima facie case of knowing falsity, or at least recklessness. Evidence showing that a statement may be wrong is insufficient.

3. The court applied the principles summarised in Tinkler v Elliott [2014] EWCA Civ 564. The applicant bears the ultimate burden of proving the elements of contempt beyond reasonable doubt, although the permission application concerns the threshold question whether a strong prima facie case exists. Carelessness alone is insufficient.

4. Permission also requires the court to be satisfied that proceedings serve the public interest, are proportionate and accord with the overriding objective. Materiality and the use made of the alleged false statement are important. Delay, evidential weakness, likely costs and court time are also relevant.

5. The evidence did not establish a strong prima facie case of deliberate dishonesty. At most, it suggested possible errors in recollection concerning events many years earlier. The allegation involved an alleged conspiracy between three people, including a professional adviser, without a credible explanation for such conduct.

6. The proposed proceedings were not in the public interest. Their principal purpose was to obtain a declaration supporting a further attempt to annul the defendant’s bankruptcy order. That would amount to a collateral attack on issues already determined in earlier proceedings. Committal jurisdiction is not available to pursue a private grievance.

7. The delay from the alleged discovery of the statements to the application, together with the substantial time and expense likely to be involved, also made proceedings disproportionate. Permission was therefore declined.

The judgment was a first-instance decision on the defendant’s application for permission to bring committal proceedings. The judgment records earlier decisions concerning applications to annul the defendant’s bankruptcy order, but no appeal from the present decision.