CM v Bradford Metropolitan District Council & Anor

In discrimination challenges to state-benefit rules, the sole question on justification is whether the difference in treatment is manifestly without reasonable foundation. That question is answered by asking whether the difference is manifestly disproportionate to a legitimate aim, not by applying a separate two-stage proportionality inquiry.

A scheme may lawfully use discretionary housing payments to address disability-related housing needs requiring individual assessment. A general exemption is required only where a claimant has a transparent medical need for additional accommodation. Difficulty finding suitable accessible shared accommodation is a matter for individual evaluation and does not itself require an exemption from the shared-accommodation rate.

The appellant, a wheelchair user aged under 35, rented a self-contained studio flat. Her housing benefit was limited to the shared-accommodation local housing allowance rate under regulation 13D(2) of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006. This created a monthly rent shortfall.

The First-tier Tribunal found disability discrimination under Article 14, read with Article 1 of the First Protocol, but held that it was justified because discretionary housing payments could address the appellant’s circumstances. The appellant appealed on the basis that the tribunal had applied the wrong justification test, wrongly treated her as outside a discrete group, and wrongly relied on discretionary housing payments.

The central issue was whether the discriminatory impact of regulation 13D(2) on wheelchair users needing accessible accommodation was manifestly without reasonable foundation.

1. Appeal dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal made no material error of law and its decision stood.

2. In a state-benefits discrimination case, the sole justification question is whether the difference in treatment is manifestly without reasonable foundation. The inquiry is whether that difference is manifestly disproportionate to its legitimate aim. It is not a separate two-stage process in which ordinary proportionality is first decided and the manifest-without-reasonable-foundation test is then separately applied.

3. The First-tier Tribunal had asked whether the scheme was proportionate, rather than whether the difference in treatment was manifestly disproportionate. That was an error in formulation. It was immaterial because it could not properly have found the impact of regulation 13D(2) on the appellant’s position to be manifestly disproportionate.

4. The policy aims behind the shared-accommodation rate, including control of housing-benefit expenditure, fairness between benefit recipients and those in work, and reduction of work disincentives, were legitimate. The Secretary of State could choose to address varied disability-related housing needs through individual discretionary housing payments rather than broad categorical exemptions.

5. R (Carmichael and Rourke) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] UKSC 58 distinguished transparent medical needs for an additional bedroom from needs requiring individual evaluation. A wheelchair user’s difficulty in finding accessible shared accommodation fell within the latter category. The appellant had not established that she could not share accommodation or had a medically evidenced need for sole occupancy. The availability of discretionary housing payments therefore provided a lawful case-by-case response.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): dismissed the appeal and upheld the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
• First-tier Tribunal, Bradford East: on 8 August 2013, found disability discrimination but held it justified and dismissed the appeal against the housing-benefit decision (file reference SC240/13/04504).